As is well known, a driver consuming alcohol can lead to a car accident. Probably, no one would deny this statement. But if you drink 100 or 150 grams of brandy, vodka, or some other strong drink half an hour before driving, it does not mean that you will definitely get into an accident. No, a combination of conditions must arise that leads to a traffic accident.
Suppose a drunk driver is a risk that accounts for 20% of this sum. Speeding − another 20%, poor visibility on the road − 10%, slippery roads − 20%, and finally, the sudden appearance of another road user − the last 30%. That’s it! Bingo! Four or even three components are enough for you to get into an accident. But if you have only one component, and the other conditions are absent, then you are likely to make it home safely.
At the time of writing, the war continues, and martial law in Ukraine imposes certain restrictions on criticizing the actions of the authorities. Therefore, Ukrainian society does not fully understand the reasons for the Russian invasion and the catastrophic events of the first month of the war. The closure of Medvedchuk’s TV channels is only one of the reasons why Putin decided to attack Ukraine. And not even the main one.
Zelensky could not only shut down pro-Russian TV channels − he could even give Medvedchuk a life sentence for treason with the help of his pocket judges. And even then, the war would not necessarily have started. But there is one condition: if only Ukraine had a strong army and was ready for defense.
Subsequent events showed that the incompetent actions of the Ukrainian president and the fabulous corruption with state finances were precisely the mechanism that let the genie out of the bottle. Putin and his subordinates closely watched the situation in Ukraine. And, obviously, in the second half of 2020, the Russian leader decided to prepare for an attack. The closure of Medvedchuk’s TV channels only strengthened his confidence that this had to be done before Zelensky left office.
There is a whole complex of reasons why the war started. The first has already been mentioned. Putin missed the opportunity to influence Ukrainian politics by political means. The closure of television channels belonging to Viktor Medvedchuk drastically reduced the chances of pro-Russian forces in the next elections.
The next reason for the war is the failed preparation for defense. The state defense order for 2020 in Ukraine was disrupted. By the end of September 2020, the Ministry of Defense had not used more than 20 billion hryvnias for the purchase of weapons and equipment repair. For the first time in several years, the 2021 state budget reduced funding for the army. The government and the Minister of Defense of Ukraine appointed by Zelensky, Andriy Taran, cut or sabotaged army rearmament programs. The production program for “Vilkha” missiles was stopped. The state did not allocate funding for the Pavlohrad Chemical Plant, which produces rocket fuel. As a result, the plant was shut down, and 687 workers were laid off.
The catastrophic state of the Ukrainian army on the eve of the war is evidenced by the fact that for three years (2019 – 2022), the government did not purchase a single shell for the Armed Forces. Therefore, just a few days after the full-scale invasion, Ukraine was forced to ask Western countries for urgent help in supplying artillery shells. Before the war, the president and his entourage were much more interested in financing their megaproject “Big Construction”. Unlike the army, here the state generously allocated tens of billions of hryvnias to private companies.
The third reason is the fall of the pro-American government in Afghanistan. The lightning-fast victory of the Taliban and Kabul surrendered without a fight greatly inspired the Kremlin. Russian propagandists began to broadcast on their media platforms dreams of how Ukrainian officials would fight for seats on planes flying to the West from Boryspil. The scenario in which Zelensky’s power would collapse just as Ashraf Ghani’s government did was taken quite seriously in Moscow.
The fourth reason for the war is the gross errors of Russian intelligence in analyzing the situation in Ukraine. We do not know exactly what role intelligence data played in Putin’s decision. It is possible that some Russian analysts were skeptical about the possibility of repeating the Afghan scenario of 2021. But Putin decided to rely on the data he liked more. They suggested that Ukraine’s resistance would last no more than a few days.
Of course, Putin considered himself a great expert on the Ukrainian issue. But now it is clear to everyone that he made a mistake, not the first one. Both in 2004 during the first Maidan and in 2014 during the second Maidan, he underestimated the level of self-organization of Ukrainian society and stubbornly refused to take into account local specifics. Putin somehow always uses the Soviet template. He still thinks that the situation in Ukraine is similar to the Russian one, as it was decades ago in the times of the USSR.
Indeed, Ukrainians are very similar to Russians. However, there are significant differences, not only in mentality but, more importantly, in social relations. Over 30 years of independence, powerful civil and political institutions have emerged in Ukraine, preventing the establishment of authoritarianism and a return to the Russia-centric development model.
Putin underestimated the influence of Western Ukraine, which several times played the role of “Ukrainian Piedmont,” a catalyst for national revival, in the country’s history. He underestimated the role of Ukrainian churches (the Kyiv Patriarchate, which later transformed into the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, and the Greek Catholic Church). Putin did not pay attention to the presence in Ukraine of powerful democratic forces represented in parliament. Finally, he did not consider the influence of Ukrainian oligarchs.
All these reasons are absent in Russia. There is no region there where a quarter of the population lives and which completely rejects the Eurasian development vector. There is no hint of an independent public stance of the Russian Orthodox Church. And, of course, in Russia, the democratic opposition has long been unrepresented in parliament, and the oligarchs have clearly learned the rule not to play politics.