3. The Green Party of Ukraine − The Harbinger of Zelensky’s Future Victory

The scale of Lazarenko’s activities showed that Ukrainian corruption had evolved beyond the usual bribery. Unlike the Soviet era, officials and deputies now had an unprecedented opportunity to distribute state funds in the interest of private business. This also opened wide horizons for lobbying their interests in the privatization of state property. The question was only how to obtain a state position that gives access to corrupt enrichment.

From the mid-90s, businessmen of various levels began to show a keen interest in obtaining a parliamentary mandate. This first became evident in the 1998 parliamentary elections. The range of participants in this electoral campaign was so wide that it included a party which, unlike the others, did not declare a clear stance on the main political issues and focused on the youth. This was the Green Party of Ukraine (GPU).

Political technologists, researching electoral preferences for their clients, found that a significant number of voters were tired of politics. Theoretically, this gave an opportunity to get a new party into the Verkhovna Rada, positioning itself against both leftist politicians and national patriots. In simple terms, there was a great opportunity to monetize the protest and apolitical electorate.

The electoral campaign of the Green Party of Ukraine was in many ways similar to Zelensky’s campaign. The main slogan was based on the anti-elitist template “Politicians engage in demagoguery,” which populists often use in various forms. Since the GPU’s target electoral base was the youth, bright advertising spots were broadcast on television channels, contrasting “greens” with systemic politicians. Also, concerts of the popular rock band “Scriabin” took place in many cities of Ukraine in support of the party, under the slogan “Preserve nature for life.”

The results of the 1998 elections showed that the calculation was correct. Apolitical and protest voters fell for the technology used for the first time. More than 1.44 million Ukrainians or 5.43% of all voters voted for the GPU. The “Greens” sent 19 deputies to the parliament, more than half of whom (10 deputies) turned out to be representatives of big business. It adds a particular piquancy that two of these ten deputies were involved in the trade of oil products, that is, they hardly fought for the environment, quite the contrary.

The success of the Green Party showed that even apolitical voters could be attracted to one’s side by offering them situational projects that match their interests or beliefs. However, subsequent attempts to do something similar ended in failure. In 2002, the pro-government party “Women for the Future” failed to overcome the 4-percent barrier to enter parliament. A similar result that year was shown by the political project “Winter Generation Committee,” which targeted representatives of small and medium-sized businesses.

The GPU was the only successful populist project until Zelensky appeared. Having entered parliament, the greens did not show any achievements there, and their popularity gradually faded. This is unsurprising, as most of their faction came to lobby their own business interests, not to fight for the environment. In the next 2002 elections, the Green Party of Ukraine failed to overcome the 4-percent barrier.

>>> 4. The Elimination of the “Against All” Option

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