In March 2020, Volodymyr Zelensky announced the start of a large-scale infrastructure project called “Big Construction.” Initially, many thought it was just another fantasy of the president. He had already shared his plans for future megaprojects with journalists, the implementation of which was hard to imagine under Ukrainian conditions. For instance, Zelensky proposed creating an analog of America’s Silicon Valley in Kharkiv, opening a Disneyland somewhere in Ukraine, and building a “Ukrainian Hollywood.”
But this time, things got serious. In 2020, 121.8 billion hryvnias ($4.5 billion) were decided to be allocated for road repairs and construction of various infrastructure objects, and in 2021 – another 140 billion hryvnias ($5.1 billion). The project was partially funded through state loans and international aid.
A peculiar feature of the “Big Construction” was that the cost of one kilometer of new road under Zelensky tripled compared to 2018. Another interesting fact is that, by the end of 2020, 62% of all construction contracts were won by a cartel of six road companies.
To ensure no outsider could win a large tender, the parliamentary majority controlled by the president passed a special law provision, according to which only participants who had experience in performing work not less than the size of the announced tender could participate in the tender. Simultaneously, the client, represented by the state company “Ukravtodor,” deliberately increased the sizes of tenders. They exceeded 1 billion hryvnias.
Formally, the tender’s profitability was about 20%. However, in addition to the margin, the tenders also inflated the prices of construction materials: by 20% or even 30% above the real price.
Corruption in the “Big Construction” reached such an extent that every influential official from the President’s Office had their “favorite” road construction company, which they lobbied. For instance, Zelensky was associated with the Turkish company “Onur.” Yuriy Golik, Kyrylo Tymoshenko, and Andriy Yermak had other proteges.
Outsiders were cut off from state funds by various methods. In early 2021, a tender for the construction of the “Dnipro” airfield was won by “Altis” company, which offered 3.95 billion hryvnias. But someone disliked it. The Antimonopoly Committee, then headed by Olha Pishchanska — the sister of Zelensky’s close friend Svitlana Pishchanska, blocked the funding of construction works for two months, and the tender winner could not meet its terms. As a result, the contract with “Altis” was terminated, and a new tender was won by the company “Onur,” close to Zelensky. The cost of the work after this increased by 1.7 billion hryvnias.
Even a superficial analysis of the situation gives every reason to assert that the “Big Construction” was a large-scale corruption project. Three years before the full-scale war, Ukraine spent about $10 billion on it. At least $1 billion from this amount settled in the crypto wallets of officials close to the president. Essentially, Zelensky revived Yanukovych’s corruption schemes. Only then, instead of the “Big Construction,” it was the preparation for the European Football Championship.
Adding particular cynicism is the fact that, to finance roads, the government canceled or significantly reduced the execution of many other programs, including the purchase of weapons for the army. During three years of Zelensky’s presidency, not a single shell was purchased for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Programs for missile production and modern types of weapons were shut down. Instead, funds previously allocated for the army were redirected to the corrupt project “Big Construction.”