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In March 2020, Volodymyr Zelensky announced the start of a large-scale infrastructure project called “Big Construction.” Initially, many thought it was just another fantasy of the president. He had already shared his plans for future megaprojects with journalists, the implementation of which was hard to imagine under Ukrainian conditions. For instance, Zelensky proposed creating an analog of America’s Silicon Valley in Kharkiv, opening a Disneyland somewhere in Ukraine, and building a “Ukrainian Hollywood.”

But this time, things got serious. In 2020, 121.8 billion hryvnias ($4.5 billion) were decided to be allocated for road repairs and construction of various infrastructure objects, and in 2021 – another 140 billion hryvnias ($5.1 billion). The project was partially funded through state loans and international aid.

A peculiar feature of the “Big Construction” was that the cost of one kilometer of new road under Zelensky tripled compared to 2018. Another interesting fact is that, by the end of 2020, 62% of all construction contracts were won by a cartel of six road companies.

To ensure no outsider could win a large tender, the parliamentary majority controlled by the president passed a special law provision, according to which only participants who had experience in performing work not less than the size of the announced tender could participate in the tender. Simultaneously, the client, represented by the state company “Ukravtodor,” deliberately increased the sizes of tenders. They exceeded 1 billion hryvnias.

Formally, the tender’s profitability was about 20%. However, in addition to the margin, the tenders also inflated the prices of construction materials: by 20% or even 30% above the real price.

Corruption in the “Big Construction” reached such an extent that every influential official from the President’s Office had their “favorite” road construction company, which they lobbied. For instance, Zelensky was associated with the Turkish company “Onur.” Yuriy Golik, Kyrylo Tymoshenko, and Andriy Yermak had other proteges.

Outsiders were cut off from state funds by various methods. In early 2021, a tender for the construction of the “Dnipro” airfield was won by “Altis” company, which offered 3.95 billion hryvnias. But someone disliked it. The Antimonopoly Committee, then headed by Olha Pishchanska — the sister of Zelensky’s close friend Svitlana Pishchanska, blocked the funding of construction works for two months, and the tender winner could not meet its terms. As a result, the contract with “Altis” was terminated, and a new tender was won by the company “Onur,” close to Zelensky. The cost of the work after this increased by 1.7 billion hryvnias.

Even a superficial analysis of the situation gives every reason to assert that the “Big Construction” was a large-scale corruption project. Three years before the full-scale war, Ukraine spent about $10 billion on it. At least $1 billion from this amount settled in the crypto wallets of officials close to the president. Essentially, Zelensky revived Yanukovych’s corruption schemes. Only then, instead of the “Big Construction,” it was the preparation for the European Football Championship.

Adding particular cynicism is the fact that, to finance roads, the government canceled or significantly reduced the execution of many other programs, including the purchase of weapons for the army. During three years of Zelensky’s presidency, not a single shell was purchased for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Programs for missile production and modern types of weapons were shut down. Instead, funds previously allocated for the army were redirected to the corrupt project “Big Construction.”

>>> 22. Dubious Benefits for Oligarchs

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It would be a mistake to think that Zelensky, upon becoming president, would limit himself to merely lobbying Kolomoisky’s business interests. The first alarm bell, indicating that the new president is trying to tread the familiar path of corruption typical for Ukrainian officials, rang just a month after the inauguration.

On July 16, 2019, Zelensky decided to revive Yanukovych’s idea, expressing a desire to host the Olympics in Lviv. On the same day, the Ministry of Youth and Sports and the National Olympic Committee were ordered to develop a strategic plan for hosting these sports competitions in Ukraine.

“We need a certain plan, saying, for example, that we are ready to build everything in 3-4 years, and then we can be in line to host the Olympics. We must be ambitious,” Zelensky stated.

At first glance, what’s wrong with hosting the world’s most prestigious sports games in the largest city of Western Ukraine? It would undoubtedly stimulate the development of the tourism and construction industries, at least in the west. However, upon closer examination, the overall balance between advantages and disadvantages is not in favor of this project. Over the last 20 years, almost all Olympics, both summer and winter, have only brought billion-dollar losses to the host countries.

Ukraine, one of the poorest countries in Europe, had already experienced hosting major sports competitions. In 2012, during President Yanukovych’s time, four Ukrainian cities hosted the European Football Championship. Having spent $5.5 billion on preparations for the Euro, Ukraine only recouped $1 billion. The lion’s share of the money settled in the accounts of construction companies linked to Yanukovych’s Party of Regions’ allies.

The love for sports from Yanukovych and Zelensky is simple to explain. The specifics of Ukrainian corruption require adherence to a certain procedure. Budget money cannot just be stolen outright. Formally, it needs to be spent on something. Large infrastructure projects are best suited for this. State funding is distributed to companies connected to those in power through inflated construction contracts. Tender conditions for the work are written in such a way that a predetermined company wins.

Do you think a poor country, where more than 7 million pensioners receive about $100 a month, can afford to spend $8 billion on a two-week sports show? The answer is probably clear.

Undoubtedly, Zelensky’s desire to host the Olympics was not just about populism, but a cold calculation of a pickpocket choosing a victim in a subway car. Only a month had passed since the newly elected head of state took office, but his first steps indicated that Ukrainians were not just in for a show — they were doomed to be robbed.

The project to host the Olympics ended in nothing. The desire to host the Olympic Games does not guarantee their realization. There is significant competition between economically developed countries, for whom spending $10 billion on sports competitions is not a big problem. Later, Zelensky repeated the idea of hosting the Olympics in Lviv several times. The last time it was mentioned was in September 2021 during the visit to Ukraine of the IOC President Thomas Bach. But it went no further than talks. Later, the war started, and the Olympic Games were no longer a priority.

However, Zelensky was not particularly upset. He and his team found another, quicker, and more effective way to enrich themselves: the large-scale road repair program “Big Construction.”

>>> 21. The Big Construction − The Heist of the Century from Ukraine’s Budget

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Kolomoisky was never keen on philanthropy. Unlike, for example, Pinchuk, who considers himself a patron of the arts, or Akhmetov, whose TV channel often liked to recall how Rinat Leonidovich helps the residents of Donbas. True, for some time, Kolomoisky financed the football team “Dnipro,” which hardly brought any profit. But this cannot be called charity. For oligarchs, owning their football club is like having a three-deck yacht off the coast of Sardinia. An expensive toy.

The money and resources that Kolomoisky spent on Zelensky’s victory were not charitable aid. It was an investment. Just two weeks after the inauguration, Zelensky began to repay the oligarch for his support in the election. And not with his own, but with state funds.

In early June 2019, the State Property Fund changed the composition of the supervisory board of “Centrenergo.” This state company is known for generating about 8% of all electricity in Ukraine, owning three thermal power plants: Uglegorsk, Zmiyiv, and Trypilska. On June 26, the new supervisory board of “Centrenergo” changes its director. The new head, Volodymyr Potapenko, almost immediately after appointment, signs direct contracts for the sale of electricity to Ihor Kolomoisky’s companies. Electricity was sold at prices significantly below market rates. At the same time, the new director ignored more favorable offers from other buyers.

As a result of such strange management, the state company “Centrenergo” missed out on 700 million hryvnias ($28 million) in less than four months. By the end of 2019, the net loss of “Centrenergo” exceeded 2 billion hryvnias ($80 million). Although in 2018 and the year before, this company consistently showed good profit.

At this point, someone might ask: “What about the government? Why did it allow the state company to be robbed?” To answer these questions, we need to remember whom Volodymyr Zelensky appointed as Prime Minister. This person became 35-year-old Oleksiy Honcharuk — the youngest head of government in the history of Ukraine (the previous record was held by 40-year-old Arseniy Yatsenyuk).

Before his appointment to the country’s second most important position, Honcharuk had no experience in managing in the public sector or private business. He had never held an elected position. Formally, since 2007, Oleksiy Honcharuk was considered a lawyer and headed several public organizations. But in 2012, he earned money by participating as an extra in Andriy Palchevsky’s TV show. There’s still a YouTube video where you can see Honcharuk as an audience member in the studio.

Being an extra is one of the least paid jobs in Kyiv, only agreed to by poor students, the unemployed, and pensioners. At that time, it paid 100-200 hryvnias (4-8 dollars) per day. For this money, a person had to sit for 8 or even 10 hours and clap on command. The “lawyer” and “public activist” Honcharuk worked as an extra.

And it was precisely this inexperienced individual whom Zelensky decided to entrust with Ukraine’s economy. It is now clear that this appointment occurred only because Kolomoisky’s group needed a Prime Minister who would sign the necessary documents without any questions and could easily be blamed for all the problems later.

That’s exactly what happened. By the end of 2019, the hole in Ukraine’s state budget grew to 120 billion hryvnias, 30 billion more than stipulated by the budget law. The state did not receive almost 37 billion planned revenues from customs and taxes. The budget was fulfilled only thanks to internal borrowing at high interest rates.

In 2019, the Ministry of Finance sold government bonds worth 227 billion hryvnias (over $9 billion), 249.4% more than in 2018. The average borrowing interest rate was 16.9% per annum. In addition, $4.331 billion (+24.5% compared to 2018) and 387 million euros were borrowed. In just six months, Zelensky and his “new faces” destroyed the stable economic growth left by Poroshenko and began living in debt. Over 4.5 years of Zelensky’s rule, Ukraine’s state debt increased from $80 billion to $145 billion.

Oleksiy Honcharuk was a dilettante but not an idiot. He understood what was happening around “Centrenergo” and that he could be blamed for this theft someday. On February 26, 2020, the Cabinet of Ministers under Honcharuk decided to replace the leadership of “Centrenergo” and prepare it for privatization.

Two days later, on February 28, the Prime Minister was summoned by the President. According to sources from the “Dzerkalo Tyzhnia,” during this conversation, Zelensky stated that Kolomoisky was extremely dissatisfied with the replacement of the head of “Centrenergo.” That same evening, the head of Zelensky’s “Servant of the People” faction, David Arakhamia, informed the press that personnel decisions were planned in the government. The story ended with Honcharuk being dismissed from the position of Prime Minister of Ukraine “at his own request” on March 4, a week after crossing Kolomoisky.

After his resignation, Oleksiy Honcharuk disappeared from public politics and left for the USA for almost two years. In early 2022, two months after the war began, he returned to Ukraine. In 2023, the former prime minister announced that he heads the supervisory board of the public organization “Aerorozvidka,” which designs drones for the army.

>>> 20. The Olympics and Love for Money

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The resounding victory over Poroshenko not only uplifted the newly elected president but also those who awaited the election results from abroad. On May 16, 2019, not waiting for the official inauguration, Kolomoisky returned to Ukraine for the first time in two years. After being dismissed from the position of head of the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Administration, he initially lived in Switzerland and then, fearing arrest and extradition to the USA, moved to Israel, which does not extradite its citizens at the request of other states. According to Ukrainian law enforcement, the former owner of PrivatBank obtained an Israeli passport back in 1995. There, in the resort city of Herzliya, Kolomoisky lived until Zelensky’s victory.

Under Poroshenko, the oligarch’s problems were not limited to PrivatBank. From March to August 2015, parallel to the withdrawal of more than $5 billion from PrivatBank, Kolomoisky executed a scheme to plunder the state-owned “Ukrnafta,” where he was a minority shareholder but controlled the management. The leaders of this company illegally transferred oil worth over 10 billion hryvnias ($450 million) to five private companies, but “Ukrnafta” did not receive any funds for it.

In July 2015, the scheme was repeated in reverse. Kolomoisky’s management transferred more than 3 billion hryvnias ($135 million) from “Ukrnafta’s” accounts to shell companies for the supply of oil products. As you might have guessed, the company received neither the oil products nor a refund.

Three days after Kolomoisky’s plane landed in Kyiv, another controversial figure returned to Ukraine — Andriy Portnov, the former deputy head of Yanukovych’s Administration. During all five years of Poroshenko’s presidency, he lived in exile: first in Moscow, then in Vienna.

Portnov has an interesting biography. Born and raised in Luhansk, in the early 90s, while still studying at the local university’s correspondence department, he started working as a lawyer for an oil trading company. In 1997, 24-year-old Andriy Portnov moved to Kyiv, where he somehow obtained a position in the State Commission for Securities and Stock Market. Strangely, just a few months after his appointment, he began to rapidly climb the career ladder. At 28, Portnov became a head of the corporate finance department in this organization.

And then the promising career of the young provincial lawyer suddenly comes to a halt. A year after his appointment, Portnov resigned from public service and went into private business. He opened his own legal practice specializing in investment transactions, including those of a rather dubious nature. Around this time, Andriy Portnov met Kolomoisky and Medvedchuk.

In 2005, Portnov began to actively engage in politics and became the head of the legal department of Yulia Tymoshenko’s election campaign. According to former presidential candidate Mykhailo Brodsky, controversial politician and businessman Bohdan Hubsky, repeatedly accused of raiding property, brought Portnov into the prime minister’s staff.

Tymoshenko, as a politician, was always characterized by her indiscriminate choice of team members. Then, in 2005-2009, she hardly cared about the biography and views of her associates. The main thing was the benefit this person could bring. And since Portnov proved to be an effective lobbyist, he got a place on the party list of Yulia Tymoshenko’s Bloc and became a member of parliament in 2006.

After Yanukovych’s victory in 2010, Andriy Portnov quickly left Tymoshenko’s team and switched to working for the new president − as a deputy head of the President’s Administration.

What makes Andriy Portnov interesting in our story is that he created and controlled for many years an illegal system of influence on the courts. Initially, this was done through bribes, blackmail, or threats. Then, when Portnov became part of Yanukovych’s team, he personally selected and approved judicial candidates.

The Ukrainian law enforcement system was so flawed that Portnov managed to control the courts even when he was in opposition to President Yushchenko. And incredibly, he managed to push through the necessary court decisions even after fleeing Ukraine in 2014. Of course, things got a bit more complicated during Poroshenko’s years, but Portnov still had strong connections in the judiciary.

The former deputy head of Yanukovych’s Administration never hid his hatred for everything related to Ukrainian national revival. However, that’s a side, moral aspect of this case. But here’s what’s curious. After Zelensky came to power, people associated with Portnov appeared in his Administration (renamed almost immediately to the President’s Office): Andriy Smyrnov and Oleh Tatarov. They became deputies of the President’s Office, responsible for interactions with courts and law enforcement agencies. As it turned out later, the new president liked the idea of influencing Ukrainian courts. Now, Portnov’s judges served the interests of not Yanukovych, but Zelensky.

Even more interestingly, in the summer of 2019, Portnov began publishing information on the progress of the pre-trial investigation against former President Petro Poroshenko in his Telegram channel. He shared information that could only be possessed by the head of the State Bureau of Investigations (SBI), Roman Truba, and published this information before the head of the SBI did.

When Roman Truba was asked how Portnov was the first to receive official information from the State Bureau of Investigations, he simply could not explain anything. The leak of information continued for several more weeks. It seemed that Portnov was simply mocking everyone, flaunting his capabilities.

From all this, one thing was clear: the new president Zelensky not only took a pro-Russian official from Yanukovych’s team into his own but effectively gave him control over the key pre-trial investigation agency.

There is ample reason to believe that in February 2022, in the event of the capture of Kyiv by Russian troops, Andriy Portnov, along with the head of the Kyiv District Administrative Court (KDAC) Pavlo Vovk, was supposed to facilitate the return to power of former President Yanukovych. This is evidenced by the fact that on January 14, 2022, a month before the full-scale invasion, the KDAC accepted and opened proceedings on Yanukovych’s lawsuit against the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

In his lawsuit, the fugitive, by then sentenced in absentia to 13 years in prison, demanded the illegality of his removal from the presidency be recognized. The District Administrative Court not only opened the proceedings on this case but also scheduled the case for consideration in a simplified procedure, without summoning the parties and holding a court session. That is, the court’s decision on this lawsuit could have been made at almost any moment.

The hearing on the case was scheduled for February 16, 2022 — the very day that, according to US intelligence, was considered the start of the war. But, as we know, there was no invasion that day. Most likely, Putin promised Xi Jinping not to start the war until the end of the Olympics in Beijing. Joyfully, Zelensky thought everything was over and declared February 16 a new national holiday, Unity Day. Probably, from the point of view of an experienced comedian, a holiday was exactly what everyone needed at that moment.

On February 16, the District Administrative Court of Kyiv postponed the hearing on Yanukovych’s lawsuit against the Ukrainian parliament indefinitely. It did not close the proceedings but announced that the consideration of the case would be notified additionally. Undoubtedly, the trial was supposed to take place. But only after Kyiv was captured by Russian troops. KDAC chairman Pavlo Vovk, along with his long-time curator Andriy Portnov, were supposed to “sanctify” the court decision to return Viktor Yanukovych to power, making him the legitimate president after Zelensky’s flight or assassination.

Formally, these are only suspicions, and someone might well call all this a coincidence. After the start of the war, Portnov and Vovk still remained good friends of the Ukrainian power system. Although they have been under US sanctions for several years, Zelensky’s Office has no complaints against them.

>>> 19. On Guard for Kolomoisky’s Interests

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In the second round of the presidential elections, Volodymyr Zelensky received a record number of votes − 73.22% of voters, or 13.5 million Ukrainians voted for him. Of course, not all of these people were devoted fans of the comedian. In the first round, Zelensky received 30.6% of the vote, while his main competitor Petro Poroshenko got 17.8%. However, the antipathy towards the then-president was so great that Zelensky managed to accumulate the overwhelming majority of votes from other candidates before the second round.

Zelensky’s core electorate consisted of youth and women − especially those who are not particularly interested in politics. As for other categories of voters, there was a very wide range. Almost all supporters of pro-Russian parties, including communists (except for a negligible number of “true”, ideological followers of Lenin and Stalin), voted for Zelensky. They all hated Poroshenko for his anti-Russian policy and were ready to give their votes to anyone who could defeat him. This group also includes supporters of Putin, who understood very well the danger that the incompetent comedian coming to power posed to Ukraine. That’s why they voted for him. The worse for Ukraine, the better for Russia.

Nearly everyone who thought that Poroshenko was a corrupt politician and that Ukraine would be better off without him, even with an incompetent Zelensky, cast their votes for Zelensky. The base of this group consisted of supporters of Mikhail Saakashvili and the mayor of Lviv, Andriy Sadovyi. It also includes ultra-right nationalists from “Azov”. The latter enjoyed special support from the Minister of Internal Affairs, Arsen Avakov, who, as is known, was one of Poroshenko’s most vehement enemies.

Overall, it can be asserted that the majority of Zelensky’s voters were people who were poorly versed in politics. People who believed in the advertising billboard “The end of the era of poverty on April 21, 2019”. People who could not understand the difference between a fictional character in a TV series and a real presidential candidate. People who took the propaganda from Kolomoisky’s TV channel at face value, that Zelensky would become Ukraine’s new Ronald Reagan.

>>> 18. Zelensky and Portnov

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