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The conflict surrounding “Ukrtransnafta” might have been considered exhausted if Poroshenko hadn’t touched upon Kolomoisky’s interests in the banking sector. PrivatBank, which was 92% owned by Kolomoisky and his business partner Gennadiy Bogolyubov, was the largest Ukrainian bank. More than half of the adult population in Ukraine had accounts there. However, in 2015, the bank faced a minor issue.

The tripling depreciation of the national currency, following Yanukovych’s flight and the onset of war in Donbas, severely impacted the banking system. To avoid uncontrollable bank bankruptcies, the state regulator began cleaning up the financial market in 2015. During the year, 33 banks, which had almost no assets or were involved in money laundering schemes, lost their licenses. The National Bank also increased the reserve requirements for commercial banks.

An audit of PrivatBank revealed that it not only significantly exceeded the norm of insider loans (the bank loaned customer funds to Kolomoisky’s companies) but also needed recapitalization amounting to 113 billion hryvnias (about $5 billion). As of January 1, 2016, more than 80% of all PrivatBank’s loans were issued to companies affiliated with Kolomoisky. The absolute majority of these companies were shell companies without liquid assets for collateral.

The bank’s owners had 1.5 years to meet the regulator’s requirements. As Valeriya Gontareva, the former head of the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU), recalls, not much money was needed – about 3-4 billion hryvnias ($150-180 million). The main requirement of the National Bank was the re-registration of issued loans from shell firms to real companies with liquid assets instead of air. By April 2016, real collaterals worth 31 billion hryvnias needed to be transferred to PrivatBank’s balance sheet.

Instead of meeting the regulator’s conditions, Kolomoisky maximally delayed the negotiations. According to Minister of Finance Oleksandr Danyliuk, the oligarch proposed the state to partially buy the bank, maintain the old management, and provide guarantees against criminal prosecution. He also asked for a few months to resolve the problems.

Eventually, it became clear that Kolomoisky was not intending to increase capitalization or bring in liquid assets as collateral for previously issued loans. On December 18, 2016, the NBU declared PrivatBank insolvent, on December 21, all 100% of the bank’s shares were transferred to state ownership, and on December 23, a new management began work.

Three years later, explaining the reason for the nationalization of PrivatBank, Igor Kolomoisky blatantly lied. Since he couldn’t admit that his bank issued insider loans to shell companies and lacked the necessary reserves, the oligarch concocted his version of events. According to him, Poroshenko nationalized the bank because he wanted to control the “1+1” TV channel. But the president was mistaken, since PrivatBank owned a blocking stake in “1+1 Production,” not the TV channel itself, which holds the license for television broadcasting.

The outcome of this whole story was that Kolomoisky harbored a significant grudge against Poroshenko and still accuses the former president of taking away his business. On the other hand, it’s impossible to forget that the oligarch not only grossly violated the rules of conducting banking business but also never returned a large portion of the loans previously issued through PrivatBank, totaling more than $5 billion. By the time of nationalization, this figure was roughly equivalent to the bank’s value.

>>> 12. Why Zelensky?

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Could Poroshenko effectively oppose Kolomoisky? We will discuss this in more detail later, but for now, let’s consider the power system of those times. Ukraine in 2014-2019 was still a country with a high level of corruption. However, the scale of state budget embezzlements during Poroshenko’s time was much smaller than under the previous president, Yanukovych, who after his flight to Russia left the country with virtually an empty budget.

Before the 2019 elections, Petro Poroshenko’s opponents accused him of failing to eradicate corruption. Moreover, the president’s associates, Ihor Kononenko and Oleksandr Hranovskyi, were suspected of being involved in scams in the energy sector and embezzlements at the chemical Odesa Port Plant.

Indeed, this plant had always been a cash cow for any president without exception, from Kuchma to Zelensky. Since the Odesa Port Plant was state-owned, its managers, in agreement with Kyiv, regularly concocted various cunning schemes, as a result of which the plant earned minimal profit, and the commercial partner – the maximum. Every president, having this huge generator of black cash, stubbornly did not want to privatize the Odesa Port Plant. It remains state-owned to this day. And as you can understand, if the OPP brings in revenues, they definitely do not go to the state budget.

Interestingly, after the change of power, the Office of President Zelensky and the officials subordinate to him from the Prosecutor General’s Office, the State Bureau of Investigations, and the SBU have not been able to find any criminal activity on Poroshenko. Despite the obvious fact that Zelensky hates his predecessor, no corruption was found in his actions. But for Ukrainian anti-corruption activists and journalists, it was enough that Poroshenko couldn’t or didn’t want to make Ukraine free from corruption. It all ended with the absolute majority of corruption fighters deciding to make an infantile protest in the spirit of an offended 16-year-old schoolboy. Ignoring the professional qualities of presidential candidates, they voted for an incompetent populist associated with Ukraine’s most dangerous oligarch.

Poroshenko did not eradicate corruption for two reasons. Firstly, he did not have enough MPs to change legislation. Secondly, he did not have a strong desire to do so. Like every president before and after him, instead of destroying the judicial mafia, it was much more convenient for Poroshenko to manually negotiate this or that court decision. While he held the presidency, most judges heeded the advice of his Administration officials. And Poroshenko was satisfied with this.

The fundamental basis of Ukrainian corruption is the impunity of judges, which allows them to issue unlawful judicial decisions in favor of interested parties. This problem can only be solved by changing the Constitution. It turned out that the judicial branch of power in Ukraine is incapable of self-purification through control by the High Council of Justice. Fighting corruption in the judiciary is only possible by abolishing judges’ immunity and holding them criminally responsible for issuing illegal decisions. For this, the president or other initiators of constitutional change need to have not just a majority (226 MPs) in parliament, but a constitutional majority (300 MPs).

The parliamentary majority, which theoretically should have supported Poroshenko’s reforms, was a shaky construction created from the pro-presidential party “Petro Poroshenko Block” (132 MPs) and the “People’s Front” party (82 MPs).

Other factions that joined the coalition at the beginning of the work of the 8th convocation of the Verkhovna Rada (2014 – 2019) left it after a year and a half. First, the faction of the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko fell off, then “Batkivshchyna” of Yulia Tymoshenko and “Self Reliance” of Lviv Mayor Andriy Sadovyi. Since 2016, the pro-presidential coalition had the minimum number of deputies. During important votes, parliamentary votes had to be bought periodically. Such are the realities of Ukrainian politics.

For example, in December 2016, the coalition lacked votes to pass the budget for the next year. The faction of the Radical Party, which had already left the coalition by that time, kindly agreed to support this vote. However, it turned out that for this, the head of the faction, Oleh Lyashko, requested the inclusion in the budget of an allocation of 600 million hryvnias (about $25 million) for the purchase of fire trucks at the “Pozhmashina” factory in Chernihiv region. This factory belonged to the head of the local branch of the Radical Party. Two years earlier, Lyashko had already lobbied for the purchase of fire trucks at the same enterprise, but then the amount was three times less – only 200 million hryvnias. Similar lobbying schemes worked with other factions and individual MPs.

Like Zelensky, the leader of the Radical Party, Oleh Lyashko, was a populist, easily giving voters the most diverse promises. An interesting fact from his biography: in the early 90s, Lyashko was convicted of fraud. He spent several years in prison and was released under the 1996 amnesty on the occasion of the adoption of the Constitution and the 5th anniversary of Ukraine’s Independence.

The difference between Lyashko and Zelensky was felt in the scale of the electoral base. If Zelensky managed to unite around himself maximally wide layers of the population from almost all regions of the country, then Lyashko mainly focused on poorly educated rural voters of the Central part of Ukraine. As a result, the more powerful populist project “Servant of the People” by Zelensky absorbed the electorate of the Radical Party. In the snap elections of 2019, Oleh Lyashko’s party did not overcome the 5-percent barrier to enter parliament.

Due to the constant lack of deputies to adopt the necessary bills, the “People’s Front” faction received a golden share. Almost everything depended on the position of its leadership: Oleksandr Turchynov (Chairman of the Security Council, acting President in 2014), Arseniy Yatsenyuk (Prime Minister 2014-2016), and Arsen Avakov (Minister of Internal Affairs 2014-2021). Poroshenko had serious problems with the latter, especially towards the end of his five-year presidential term.

Avakov almost openly worked against Poroshenko and coordinated his actions with Kolomoisky. For example, in the winter of 2019, during the election campaign, the police, led by Avakov, covered groups of “activists” from the “National Militia” (the civilian division of “Azov”), who traveled from city to city committing hooligan actions at meetings involving the president.

The reason for the conflict between Avakov and Poroshenko dates back to 2015 when the minister’s son was accused of corruption. In February 2015, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, headed by Arsen Avakov, decided to order 5,000 backpacks from his son’s company at prices significantly higher than market ones. This classic corruption scheme could have gone unnoticed, but after some time, Ukrainian media published a video made by a hidden camera, where the younger Avakov in the office of his father’s deputy, Serhiy Chebotar, discussed the details of the backpack purchase.

After the video made noise on social networks, a criminal case was initiated against Olexandr Avakov, and his property was seized. But after a three-year investigation, the case ended in nothing and did not even reach the court. The seizure of the minister’s son’s property was lifted, and he continued to live a normal life, not spending a single night in a detention center. Nonetheless, Avakov Sr. blamed President Poroshenko for his son’s problems. In his opinion, Poroshenko could have stopped the case at the very beginning but did not want to do so. Arsen Avakov remained in office but harbored a great grudge against the president.

Perhaps the most eloquent description of Poroshenko’s political weakness is the fact that he could not fire Avakov from the position of head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, although he theoretically had such an opportunity. Considering that Avakov was one of the leaders of the People’s Front, this would automatically destroy the coalition. After early elections, the prime minister could become a person much less loyal to the president than Yatsenyuk.

And the last stroke to the portrait of Avakov and his role in this whole story. After Zelensky’s victory, Kolomoisky was in euphoria for some time, so he willingly gave frank interviews. In one of them, the scandalous oligarch stated that “Zelensky is our common victory with Avakov.”

>>> 11. Kolomoisky Declares War on Poroshenko

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On March 2, 2014, Acting President of Ukraine Oleksandr Turchynov appointed Ihor Kolomoisky as the head of Dnipropetrovsk Regional State Administration. Turchynov’s calculation was fundamentally correct. After President Yanukovych’s flight and the complete collapse of central authority, the country needed to be stabilized. Regional leaders – the most influential and wealthy people – were best suited for this. At that time, with the support of the Russian army, Crimea was being annexed. Unable to resist Putin in Crimea, Kyiv politicians feared a similar scenario in other regions.

In the spring of 2014, the interests of the Ukrainian state and oligarch Kolomoisky coincided. The oligarch feared that Putin, by capturing Ukraine, would seize his assets. But on March 3, the day after his appointment as governor, Kolomoisky, who always loved to speak publicly, made a mistake. During a TV interview, he called Putin a schizophrenic who wanted to revive the USSR or the Russian Empire. Understandably, after these statements, Kolomoisky became one of the main enemies of Russian propaganda. Later, the oligarch softened his rhetoric towards Putin and avoided harsh statements against him, even in 2022, following the full-scale invasion.

It must be acknowledged, but Kolomoisky quickly managed to establish order in the region entrusted to him. Pro-Russian forces and their leaders in Dnipropetrovsk were neutralized. How this was done was of little concern to anyone. Some were bought off, some were forced to flee the country through threats, and others disappeared into the unknown. Kolomoisky and his subordinates were such a powerful and influential force in Dnipropetrovsk Region that none of the pro-Russian forces dared to oppose them. Even the Vilkul family, the first of whom was the mayor of Kryvyi Rih and the second of whom headed the region for some time under Yanukovych.

Yes, in 2014, Kolomoisky saved Dnipropetrovsk Region from the “Russian world”, which he always proudly recalls. Losing Dnipropetrovsk could have detached several regions from Ukraine, at least Zaporizhzhia. But, fortunately, this did not happen.

In neighboring Donbas, the situation developed more dramatically. In March 2014, Turchynov offered Ukraine’s richest man – oligarch Rinat Akhmetov – to head Donetsk Region, but he refused. Given his influence in the region, he could have easily resisted pro-Russian forces, which at that time were at the stage of street rallies and the seizure of local administration buildings. Akhmetov erroneously believed that these protests could be controlled and would soon end. However, the situation quickly escalated into a military conflict, and Akhmetov lost almost all of his enterprises and mines in the part of Donbas controlled by the Russians.

Two months after the annexation of Crimea, in May 2014, it became clear that the fight against Russian hybrid aggression would be limited to Donbas only. In Odesa, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipropetrovsk, the situation was stabilized. Kolomoisky continued to head the region entrusted to him, but it was clear that he was not very interested in it. He spent most of his time not in Dnipropetrovsk but in Kyiv or with his family in Geneva. The actual leaders of the region were two of the governor’s deputies – the well-known corporate raider from Kolomoisky’s group, Hennadiy Korban, and his friend, the future mayor of Dnipro (the new name of Dnipropetrovsk since 2016), Borys Filatov.

It is worth noting that several years later, when Korban and Filatov broke off relations with Kolomoisky and left his influence, they both encountered problems at the presidential level. Violating the Constitution, Zelensky stripped Korban of Ukrainian citizenship and banned him from returning to Ukraine. Filatov was repeatedly on the verge of being removed from the position of city mayor.

While serving as the head of Dnipropetrovsk Region, Ihor Kolomoisky significantly expanded his activities. Previously, during Yanukovych’s time, he behaved quite cautiously, fearing that the president’s son, Oleksandr, also known as “Sasha the dentist,” might try to take away some of his assets. But after the events of 2014 and the successful neutralization of the “Russian world”, Kolomoisky began to act more brazenly. Apparently, he believed that his reward should be a portion of state assets.

In early 2015, tensions arose between Ihor Kolomoisky and the new president, Petro Poroshenko. The oligarch, who had controlled the state-owned company “Ukrtransnafta” since 2009, through his business partner Oleksandr Lazorko, proposed to pump out 675,000 tons of technological oil from the main oil pipeline. At that time, due to military actions in Donbas, this pipeline was not used for its intended purpose, and there was a risk that pro-Russian militants could pump oil from the pipeline in their area.

After some time, “Ukrtransnafta” emptied the pipeline and left the pumped oil in storage facilities controlled by Ihor Kolomoisky’s “Privat” group. Then, the oligarch’s structures doubled the storage tariff. As a result of this cunning scheme, the state had to pay Kolomoisky 2.5 million hryvnias or about $100,000 every day for storing its oil.

On March 13, 2015, Energy Minister Volodymyr Demchyshyn initiated the dismissal of the chairman of the board of the joint-stock company “Ukrtransnafta,” Oleksandr Lazorko, for exceeding storage costs of technological oil at the “Privat” group’s facilities. On March 19, the dismissal was approved at a meeting of the company’s Supervisory Board.

Ihor Kolomoisky reacted extremely negatively to the news of his appointee’s dismissal from the state company. Firstly, Lazorko refused to comply with the Supervisory Board’s decision and barricaded himself in his office. Secondly, on the evening of the same day, March 19, Ihor Kolomoisky himself arrived at the head office of “Ukrtransnafta” with dozens of armed men. For Ukraine, this looked like a typical scenario of a corporate raider attack. The only difference was that the armed men were brought to the company’s office by the head of Dnipropetrovsk Region.

According to the chairman of the Supervisory Board of “Ukrtransnafta,” Oleksandr Savchenko, who witnessed all these events, Kolomoisky threatened that “he has 2000 fighters, and tomorrow they will all be in Kyiv because his companies are being taken away.”

The story with “Ukrtransnafta” seemed so wild that Poroshenko decided to end it with a radical solution – the dismissal of Kolomoisky as the head of Dnipropetrovsk Region. It was not just about this episode, of course. Kolomoisky began to behave not only as a thief of state property but also as a powerful political player. However, there was one nuance: his capabilities were then limited by the lack of his own faction in parliament.

On March 25, 2015, six days after the events at the “Ukrtransnafta” office, Poroshenko dismissed Kolomoisky. According to the official formulation, the governor himself wrote a resignation letter, although the initiative came from the president.

Before announcing the dismissal, Poroshenko and Kolomoisky had a lengthy meeting. As it turned out later, the main topic of the conversation was “peaceful coexistence” between them after the dismissal. According to unofficial information, Poroshenko promised Kolomoisky not to touch his business interests and not to prosecute Lazorko, who, by his actions, had earned at least several years in prison. Indeed, after that, the former head of “Ukrtransnafta” quietly left for London, and Ukrainian law enforcement did not put him on the international wanted list. In turn, Kolomoisky promised the president not to go into opposition to the current government “for the sake of peace in Ukraine.”

By firing the thieving oligarch from a high government position, Poroshenko did what any head of state would have done. At least if we’re talking about civilized countries. But at the same time, the Ukrainian president made a fatal mistake, as it turned out later. He left Kolomoisky with a terrifying weapon in his hands – a nationwide TV channel, with which the oligarch could shape public opinion.

Putin went through something similar in 2000. And unlike Poroshenko, he knew exactly that enemies should not be left with weapons. First, he took away the control of the most popular TV channel in the country, ORT, from oligarch Berezovsky, then forced oligarch Gusinsky to sell another nationalwide channel – NTV – to the state-owned “Gazprom.” Before 2000, Berezovsky and Gusinsky naively believed that their influence on the media was enough to create problems for Putin and limit his influence. It turned out that a criminal case against the owner of a TV channel could quickly and effectively neutralize both the television killer Sergey Dorenko on ORT and the thoughtful analyst Yevgeny Kiselyov on NTV, and all other journalists.

Poroshenko did not understand this. He hoped for a truce because he was promised by a fraudster who had spent most of his adult life robbing state enterprises. As it turned out, the dismissal of Kolomoisky triggered a series of events that led to the victory of stage comedian Zelensky in the presidential elections.

>>> 10. Lyashko, Avakov, and a President on Shaky Ground

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According to Kolomoisky, he met the future president at some party in 2008 or 2009, where Zelensky was a guest, not performing in his usual role as a variety show comedian. A few years later, their acquaintance evolved into a business relationship. Starting in 2012, the variety show “Evening Kvartal” began to air in prime time on Saturday on Kolomoisky’s channel. In return, Zelensky received a portion of the advertising revenue from the channel.

It is not known for certain what level of relationship they maintained with each other until 2015. It was unlikely to be a friendship because they were people of different statuses. However, in all interviews, Kolomoisky always spoke of Zelensky with the utmost affection.

In 2021, following the leak of the Pandora Papers, it was revealed that several of Zelensky’s companies received almost $40 million from Kolomoisky as payment for television content. To minimize taxes, the money was routed through offshore companies.

Some journalists speculated that Zelensky’s offshore accounts could have been used by Kolomoisky to siphon money from PrivatBank. As is known, in 2016, the bank was nationalized by the state due to capitalization issues. But before that, Kolomoisky had extracted almost all of its liquid capital by issuing unsecured loans to shell companies.

The idea that Zelensky could have been involved in this scheme seems unlikely. The sum of $40 million fits well into the scale of the years-long collaboration between “Kvartal 95” and the “1+1” channel. It’s important to remember that the “Evening Kvartal” show aired on Saturday evening when advertising time is most expensive.

>>> 9. Poroshenko Makes a Fatal Mistake

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How did Volodymyr Zelensky manage to transform from a television comedian into the head of state? The answer to this question can be found in the history of his patron − one of the most ruthless and greedy oligarchs in Ukraine. Ihor Kolomoisky not only provided the media resource for Zelensky’s victory. Without a doubt, it was he who initiated this foray into politics. Zelensky was merely a tool in the conflict between Kolomoisky and President Poroshenko. It must be acknowledged, a very effective one.

For many years, Ihor Kolomoisky did not have a significant influence on the media. Under Kuchma, he did not need it. Despite some conflicts that occurred from time to time with other major Ukrainian businessmen (Hryhoryshyn, Pinchuk, Surkis), his business was doing well. Kolomoisky demonstrated complete loyalty to President Kuchma, backed up by generous bribes. In Ukraine, this was enough for a peaceful life and the absence of claims from law enforcement agencies.

As Ihor Valeriyovych Kolomoisky later recounted, he paid Kuchma $5 million every month. This was the fee for “using” the state company “Ukrnafta”. The majority share of this largest oil refining company in Ukraine belonged to the state. Kolomoisky, through companies affiliated with him, was a minority shareholder. For $5 million a month, he was allowed to put his management in “Ukrnafta”. As a result of this agreement, the company’s balance showed losses or minimal profit year after year. The main dividends were received by Kolomoisky’s companies. “Ukrnafta’s” management signed unfavorable contracts with them, and the government, the Accounting Chamber, and the State Property Fund turned a blind eye to this.

At the end of 2004, radical changes occurred in Ukraine. Kuchma’s plan to transfer power to his successor (leader of the Donetsk clan, Viktor Yanukovych) failed. After the election fraud, the “Orange Revolution” also known as “the first Maidan” began. Under pressure from massive protest actions, the Supreme Court canceled the results of the second round of elections. An additional third round was appointed, in which the leader of the democratic opposition, Viktor Yushchenko, won.

With Yushchenko’s rise to power, Ihor Kolomoisky felt the need for media protection. At first glance, he still had no conflicts with the new authority. Yushchenko proved to be a weak, initiative-less president who failed to implement any significant reforms during his term. Kolomoisky retained control over “Ukrnafta” and continued to successfully milk it. However, he felt the situation was quite unstable. Only owning a nationalwide TV channel could make Kolomoisky and his assets untouchable from any encroachments: both from other oligarchs and from Yushchenko’s team (Baloha, Tretiakov, Poroshenko).

In August 2005, Ihor Kolomoisky bought 40% of the shares of the TV channel “1+1” for 100 million dollars from its owners: Boris Fuksman and Olexandr Rodnyansky. Interestingly, before signing the contract for the sale of the channel, Rodnyansky significantly strengthened his security. Although Kolomoisky did not have a vivid criminal past like Yanukovych and Akhmetov, he had long been trailed by the reputation of a successful corporate raider. Therefore, the co-owner of the channel’s precautions were not superfluous.

After selling “1+1”, Rodnyansky moved to Moscow and after some time became a well-known Russian film producer. However, after the start of the full-scale war in 2022, he left Russia, returned to Kyiv, and almost immediately became an advisor to President Volodymyr Zelensky.

In August 2005, after buying the channel, Kolomoisky told in an interview with “Dzerkalo Tyzhnia” that the president’s assistant, Olexandr Tretiakov, tried to dissuade him from this deal.

“There were no threats or harsh warnings in that conversation. There was just a phrase like: ‘Why do you need this, you are businessmen, you have never been involved in politics,'” the oligarch recalled. Kolomoisky then assured Tretiakov that buying shares in “1+1” was “business and there is no politics here.”

As it turned out, this formal answer had epochal significance for the history of modern Ukraine. The transition of the “1+1” channel under the control of the owner of “PrivatBank” completed the redistribution of the television market in favor of oligarchs. From this moment on, the formation of public opinion of Ukrainian voters was handled by four media holdings:

• Starlight Media (channels ICTV, “Novy”, STB) – owner Viktor Pinchuk (metallurgy, telecommunications business, Kuchma’s son-in-law).
• Inter Media Group (channel “Inter”) − nominal owner businessman and politician Valeriy Khoroshkovsky, later the media group came under the control of gas oligarch Dmytro Firtash.
• 1+1 Media (channel “1+1”) − owner Ihor Kolomoisky (financial-industrial group “Privat”).
• TRK “Ukraine” − owner Donetsk oligarch Rinat Akhmetov (metallurgy, coal mining, energy, telecommunications).

Also, several niche news channels with a small audience were broadcasting: “5 kanal”, “Pryamyi”, 24 kanal, and “NBM” (later “Espreso” appeared based on it). The first two channels were owned by Petro Poroshenko, future President of Ukraine. He could also be called an oligarch since he actively combined politics with business and influenced the media market.

>>> 8. Meeting with Zelensky

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