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The failed political career of singer and showman Andriy Danilko, known nationwide by his stage pseudonym Verka Serduchka, is one of the most mysterious stories in Ukrainian politics. It was first discussed in the summer of 2007, before the start of registration for snap parliamentary elections. At that time, Danilko mentioned in an interview his desire to register for the elections at the head of his party. He even said he planned to organize a pre-election block called “Against All,” and overall, he was no worse than other MPs because he could fight and shout in the Verkhovna Rada better than them.

The results of closed public opinion polls showed that if Danilko actually went to the elections, practically having a deputy’s certificate was in his pocket. Moreover, he would bring at least 18-20 deputies into parliament on his coattails. This could significantly influence important issues such as forming a coalition and voting for the budget.

However, a few days later, Danilko announced that he had given up the idea of getting into politics. He did not explain the reason. Given the artist’s flamboyant image, this whole story was considered a joke.

Later, information emerged that someone from President Yushchenko’s administration (likely Viktor Baloha) met with Andriy Danilko and convinced the showman not to participate in the elections. The arguments made by the head of the administration remained a secret. It’s possible that there was some financial incentive.

If Danilko had become a deputy and the head of a parliamentary party in 2007, Ukrainian society would have received a vaccine that could have protected the country from Zelensky’s victory and all the consequences of this disaster. Most likely, having entered parliament, the singer and comedian Danilko would have followed the path of the Green Party of Ukraine. And ultimately, voters would have been disappointed not only in him but also in all non-systemic politicians from show business. But, unfortunately, this did not happen.

Interestingly, on the eve of the pivotal 2019 elections, Andriy Danilko again remembered his possible participation in the elections. According to journalist Olesya Batsman, a year before the elections, the singer was persuaded to run for president: “A lot of people persuaded him. They came from different forces, from different parties, promised very big money.”

Who these people were who persuaded Danilko remains unknown. Since many knew about Zelensky’s preparation for participation in the elections since 2017, the appearance of another apolitical showman in the presidential elections could have worsened the comedian’s chances. Zelensky and Danilko were on the same electoral field. Therefore, in a hypothetical first round of elections, they would have simply taken votes from each other.

>>> 6. Leonid Chernovetsky ­− The Most Famous Ukrainian Populist Before Zelensky

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In the early years of independence, Ukrainians had high hopes for the future. Indeed, in 1990, Ukraine and Poland were at a similar starting point. The standard of living in both countries was almost identical. Ukraine even had an advantage in the form of a more developed industry.

However, the situation unfolded according to different scenarios. Delaying market reforms did not allow Ukraine to realize its industrial potential. The financial system collapsed. In 1993-1994, the country broke the world record for hyperinflation. Part of the population, facing unemployment and a decline in living standards, began to look for work in Central and Western European countries. By 1995, the situation in the economy began to stabilize, but citizens’ dissatisfaction remained high.

Mass protests by Donbas miners, who for several months in 1993 were not paid their salaries, led to the snap presidential elections in 1994, which replaced the moderate but indecisive Leonid Kravchuk with the “red director” Leonid Kuchma. The first five-year term of this president was remembered for the monetary reform (the hryvnia finally appeared in circulation instead of the devalued coupon), the stabilization of the financial system, and the start of the privatization of large enterprises. However, it later turned out that several metallurgical plants were almost given away to Kuchma’s son-in-law — the future oligarch and owner of several TV channels, Viktor Pinchuk.

In the 90s, one form of citizens’ dissatisfaction was the emergence of the protest electorate. It was thanks to these voters that Kuchma was able to defeat the incumbent president Kravchuk. However, political technologists were concerned by the fact that a significant portion of the citizens participating in the elections marked the “Against All” option. Thus, their votes were not counted in favor of any candidate.

Political technologists of the Green Party of Ukraine managed to deceive the dissatisfied. The success of this political project showed that thanks to promises and manipulations, it is possible to make even those who believe they are outside of politics vote. But the share of those who continued to vote against all remained quite significant.

For example, in the second round of the 1999 presidential elections, when the head of state was chosen between Leonid Kuchma and the leader of the communists Petro Symonenko, almost a million voters (970 thousand) did not support any candidate. In 2004, in the epic battle between Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych, the “Against All” option was marked by 2.34% of voters or almost 700 thousand people. In the repeat voting in the 2010 presidential election, when Yulia Tymoshenko and Viktor Yanukovych made it to the second round, more than 1.1 million voters, or 4.36%, did not support any candidate. A similar result was observed in the parliamentary elections.

The situation, in which precious votes for each candidate were wasted, greatly concerned politicians. Ideally, the protest electorate should be distributed among situational projects, where each voter should choose their “green party.” However, except for 1998, it turned out to be very difficult to implement such a scenario. This was proven by the failure of political projects “Women for the Future” and “Winter Generation Committee.”

In 2011, the entourage of President Yanukovych decided to remove the “Against All” option from the electoral ballots. The 2012 parliamentary elections were considered very important for the Party of Regions, and experts likely found that the abolition of this option would more likely benefit the ruling party rather than the opposition. Either way, the decision to remove the option to vote “Against All” from the ballot had significant consequences not only in 2012 but also in the upcoming victory of Volodymyr Zelensky.

The option “I do not support any candidate” was chosen not only by protest voters but also by those who preferred non-systemic politicians − showmen and populists, such as Volodymyr Zelensky. If this option had remained in the 2019 elections, Zelensky would, of course, still have won. But his victory would not have been so overwhelming, with 73% support. Because the absolute majority of those who once voted “Against All” found their candidate − a person who mocked politicians and their parties from the stage.

>>> 5. Andriy Danilko Could Have Been in Zelensky’s Place

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The scale of Lazarenko’s activities showed that Ukrainian corruption had evolved beyond the usual bribery. Unlike the Soviet era, officials and deputies now had an unprecedented opportunity to distribute state funds in the interest of private business. This also opened wide horizons for lobbying their interests in the privatization of state property. The question was only how to obtain a state position that gives access to corrupt enrichment.

From the mid-90s, businessmen of various levels began to show a keen interest in obtaining a parliamentary mandate. This first became evident in the 1998 parliamentary elections. The range of participants in this electoral campaign was so wide that it included a party which, unlike the others, did not declare a clear stance on the main political issues and focused on the youth. This was the Green Party of Ukraine (GPU).

Political technologists, researching electoral preferences for their clients, found that a significant number of voters were tired of politics. Theoretically, this gave an opportunity to get a new party into the Verkhovna Rada, positioning itself against both leftist politicians and national patriots. In simple terms, there was a great opportunity to monetize the protest and apolitical electorate.

The electoral campaign of the Green Party of Ukraine was in many ways similar to Zelensky’s campaign. The main slogan was based on the anti-elitist template “Politicians engage in demagoguery,” which populists often use in various forms. Since the GPU’s target electoral base was the youth, bright advertising spots were broadcast on television channels, contrasting “greens” with systemic politicians. Also, concerts of the popular rock band “Scriabin” took place in many cities of Ukraine in support of the party, under the slogan “Preserve nature for life.”

The results of the 1998 elections showed that the calculation was correct. Apolitical and protest voters fell for the technology used for the first time. More than 1.44 million Ukrainians or 5.43% of all voters voted for the GPU. The “Greens” sent 19 deputies to the parliament, more than half of whom (10 deputies) turned out to be representatives of big business. It adds a particular piquancy that two of these ten deputies were involved in the trade of oil products, that is, they hardly fought for the environment, quite the contrary.

The success of the Green Party showed that even apolitical voters could be attracted to one’s side by offering them situational projects that match their interests or beliefs. However, subsequent attempts to do something similar ended in failure. In 2002, the pro-government party “Women for the Future” failed to overcome the 4-percent barrier to enter parliament. A similar result that year was shown by the political project “Winter Generation Committee,” which targeted representatives of small and medium-sized businesses.

The GPU was the only successful populist project until Zelensky appeared. Having entered parliament, the greens did not show any achievements there, and their popularity gradually faded. This is unsurprising, as most of their faction came to lobby their own business interests, not to fight for the environment. In the next 2002 elections, the Green Party of Ukraine failed to overcome the 4-percent barrier.

>>> 4. The Elimination of the “Against All” Option

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To understand why Zelensky did not stay in the field of entertainment content production but won the presidential election, one must start with the story of Pavlo Lazarenko – the Prime Minister of Ukraine in 1996-1997 and arguably the most scandalous politician of that era. He never met the main character of our book, but Lazarenko’s activities indirectly influenced the events that, ultimately, led Volodymyr Zelensky to power.

In 1990, the former agronomist, then the second secretary of the Communist Party of the Novomoskovsk district of the Dnipropetrovsk region, unexpectedly rose high in the local hierarchy. At the age of 37, Pavlo Lazarenko was elected head of the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Council. Two years after the USSR collapsed, the young official of independent Ukraine became the full-fledged master of an entire region – President Leonid Kravchuk appointed him his representative in Dnipropetrovsk.

Unlike many other regional leaders, whose criminal abilities did not go beyond customary bribery, Pavlo Lazarenko quickly realized the opportunities capitalism combined with a state position could bring him. Almost immediately after being appointed as the president’s representative, he created a cunning scheme whereby every major business in the region he was entrusted with had to pay a certain amount into Lazarenko’s personal fund.

What about law enforcement agencies? That’s the point, law enforcement agencies were subordinate to the head of the region, and not a single prosecutor dared to initiate and investigate such a case. As for Kyiv, firstly, the capital was far away, and secondly, large sums of money have a remarkable way of turning a blind eye, even in Kyiv.

In one interview, after ending his tumultuous career, Pavlo Lazarenko boasted that he was the one who paved the way for future oligarchs and politicians from Dnipropetrovsk: Pinchuk, Kolomoisky, Tymoshenko, and Tigipko. There might be some truth to this, especially regarding Yulia Tymoshenko. But was Lazarenko the “godfather” of Kolomoisky or Pinchuk?

There are big doubts about that. Both future oligarchs were not part of the governor’s mafia structure. They just submitted to him and played by his rules. At that time, Lazarenko was the powerful head of Ukraine’s largest region, while Pinchuk and Kolomoisky were just two local businessmen who had to pay the regional master for the right to make money on his territory.

Pinchuk and Kolomoisky not only paid certain sums into the head of the regional state administration’s fund but also agreed to give him a share of their business. According to the Ukrainian version of Forbes magazine, in 1996, Lazarenko ordered Kolomoisky and his business partner Boholiubov to transfer 16.7% of the oil company “Sentosa Ltd” to his driver, Leonid Hadiachuk, and give away 14% of the shares of the company “Solm,” which owned a third of PrivatBank. It should be noted that after receiving a share in someone else’s business, as a decent racketeer, Pavlo Lazarenko in every way facilitated the development of PrivatBank.

In 1995, the young official from Dnipropetrovsk moved up, relocated to the capital, and became the first Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine. A year later, he took the highest post after the president as the head of the government. By that time, Pavlo Ivanovych Lazarenko was only 43 years old.

Why did Kuchma agree to appoint him as Prime Minister? Several factors contributed to this. Lazarenko already had his own “Unity” faction in the parliament. The moment for adopting a new Constitution was approaching, so the president needed additional votes from deputies. Moreover, Leonid Kuchma did not really like the previous Prime Minister – former KGB general Yevhen Marchuk. He saw him as a potential competitor in the upcoming presidential elections, whereas Lazarenko assured Kuchma of his loyalty. And, of course, the governor of the Dnipropetrovsk region impressed as an effective manager who could quickly restore order. Firmness, cunning, endurance – that was his element.

It is believed that Lazarenko invented the corrupt practice of buying deputies of the Verkhovna Rada. The term “buying” implies luring formally independent MPs elected in single-member district and deputies from other factions into his faction.

Kuchma and Lazarenko worked together for just over a year. The young talent from Dnipropetrovsk did not show any special breakthroughs in the economy. However, the shadow scale of Pavlo Lazarenko’s activities troubled Kuchma. The president was indifferent to corruption – he knew perfectly well what the Prime Minister was doing and for some time, it suited him. But Lazarenko concentrated large financial resources in his hands, and there were just over two years left until the elections. Kuchma planned to be re-elected for a second term, so any Prime Minister who was shown daily to the whole country on television was a priori a potential competitor for him.

On July 2, 1997, Pavlo Lazarenko was dismissed from the position of the head of the government allegedly “due to health reasons.” It seemed that after this, he should fade into obscurity. Having lost political protection from prosecution by law enforcement agencies, the former Prime Minister, at a minimum, should have been cautious about Kuchma, since the president controlled the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the SBU (Security Service of Ukraine, Sluzhba Bezpeky Ukrainy). However, Lazarenko so believed in his own fortunate fate that he decided to become the leader of the opposition and return to power. Later it turned out to be his biggest mistake.

Here it’s worth adding a few words about where the former agronomist got such huge financial resources, by the standards of the time. Regular levies from Kolomoisky, Pinchuk, and other Dnipropetrovsk businessmen were just the tip of the iceberg. Pavlo Lazarenko earned even more on the gas market as an unofficial co-owner of the company “EESU.”

In the early 90s, Lazarenko became close to the local businesswoman Yulia Tymoshenko, who once started with a video rental shop and then moved on to trading oil products and gas. For a while, Tymoshenko’s business partners were Viktor Pinchuk and Serhiy Tigipko.

Thanks to cooperation with the president’s representative, Tymoshenko’s company “United Energy Systems of Ukraine” (EESU) became the main supplier of gas to the enterprises of the Dnipropetrovsk region. In 1996, when Pavlo Lazarenko became Prime Minister, Tymoshenko moved to a national level and also relocated to Kyiv.

Buying gas in Turkmenistan for $36 per 1000 cubic meters, Tymoshenko’s company almost immediately sold it in Ukraine for $80. In just a few years, both partners: Tymoshenko and Lazarenko earned at least $300 million. In the 90s, this was a fantastic amount.

The scale of cooperation between the two partners is evidenced by the testimony for the FBI, which on May 17, 2000, was given by Pavlo Lazarenko’s former friend and ally – Petro Kirichenko. According to him, Pavlo Lazarenko paid Prime Minister Marchuk $7 million for allowing Tymoshenko’s company to enter the gas trade market. The money was transferred to Marchuk’s account at Union Bank of Switzerland.

As for cooperation with Kuchma, according to the same Kirichenko, in a private conversation, after his dismissal as Prime Minister, Lazarenko told him that he owed Kuchma $50 million, but he would rather spend that money to remove him from office than return them to the president. Why Lazarenko owed Kuchma $50 million remained a mystery. Kirichenko also stated in his testimony to the FBI that, while serving as the head of the government, Lazarenko transferred $3 million to a company controlled by the president’s assistant, Olexandr Volkov.

None of Kuchma’s entourage, including Pinchuk and Kolomoisky, ever testified against Lazarenko for American law enforcement. Although publicly, President Kuchma regularly called the former Prime Minister the main corrupt official and the cause of all the troubles of Ukrainians.

Yulia Tymoshenko’s fate turned out to be even more interesting. Having moved to Kyiv, the former video rental shop owner made a dizzying political career. After Lazarenko’s downfall, she quickly shed him as a toxic asset, left his “Hromada” party, and created her own political project “Batkivshchyna.” She became Prime Minister twice, was in opposition to Presidents Kuchma and Yanukovych, and was twice imprisoned on trumped-up charges. Eventually, Yulia Tymoshenko’s highest achievement was participating in the presidential elections in 2010 and 2014, where she twice came in second, losing first to Viktor Yanukovych and then to Petro Poroshenko.

But let’s return to 1997. After resigning, Lazarenko automatically acquired the status of a member of parliament (at that time, the Verkhovna Rada had a norm that allowed combining deputy activity and work in the government). Setting himself the goal of becoming Prime Minister again, and possibly even President, he began actively encouraging other MPs to switch to his banner. The price tag: $30,000 for joining Lazarenko’s faction and $7,000 monthly.

Buying deputies within the parliament, like a cancerous tumor, quickly spread to other parties. This phenomenon reached its greatest extent under President Yanukovych. In 2012, joining the pro-government faction of the Party of Regions paid between $500,000 to $2 million plus a monthly “salary” of $30,000-50,000. Some deputies were offered up to $5 million to join.

Around the same time, another illegal practice spread among Ukrainian parties: selling places in parliament. A large businessman could easily become a Rada deputy for just $5-10 million. Typically, even now, at least 10% of the seats in parliamentary factions are occupied by those who bought their deputy seat in exchange for financial support before the elections.

Nearly 30 years have passed since Lazarenko’s time. And although luring deputies in parliament is now banned, unofficial salaries are still paid. According to several deputies who scandalously left the “Servant of the People” faction, each of its members receives “in an envelope” from the President’s Office from $20,000 to $50,000 monthly. The maximum amount ($50,000) is paid to the head of the Verkhovna Rada committee. The deputy chairman of the committee receives $30,000 each month. Meanwhile, the official salary of a people’s deputy is about 48,000 hryvnias ($1,200).

It should be noted that political corruption is widespread even in opposition factions. There, too, salaries are paid “in envelopes.” In the Ukrainian parliament, financial motivation is the best guarantee that a MP will vote in unison with the party leader.

In civilized countries, such manipulations are considered a criminal offense. Firstly, monthly cash gifts or cryptocurrency are not declared for tax purposes. That is, at the very least, tax evasion. Secondly, it’s bribery. Thirdly, the sources of these funds are highly questionable. For example, in 2023, the “Servant of the People” faction had about 200 deputies. Even by the minimum calculation, Zelensky annually spent $50 million just to ensure that deputies did not act too independently and disciplinedly voted for the necessary bills.

Undoubtedly, these $50 million are not personally paid by Zelensky or Yermak out of their pockets. Obviously, there is a black fund filled from corrupt sources: primarily, from the infrastructure program “Big Construction.”

Pavlo Lazarenko is interesting for our story in that he was the first to show that big money in Ukraine could be made in politics. And his downfall became a lesson and an example for the new oligarchs who bulked up during Kuchma’s second presidential term: Kolomoisky, Pinchuk, and Akhmetov.

Lazarenko’s mistake was that he overestimated his capabilities and did not take into account the power of the media. Without media support (except for a few newspapers), Lazarenko went against the all-powerful President Kuchma. And just a year and a half later, due to the threat of arrest, he had to flee abroad. On February 14, 1999, Pavlo Lazarenko flew to Greece and then to New York, where he was detained at the airport with a Panamanian passport.

In America, Lazarenko was charged with money laundering. A year before being detained at JFK terminal, he bought a large house near San Francisco for $6.7 million, where Hollywood actor Eddie Murphy once lived. Since Lazarenko could not explain the legal origin of such a significant sum, this fact became one of the list of charges in an American court. Then, to money laundering, were added fraud and racketeering. The main witness against the former Prime Minister was his ally Petro Kirichenko. As it turned out later, Pavlo Lazarenko forced him to give up a share in the business too.

After several years of court hearings, Lazarenko received 12 years in prison. Having been released in 2012, he stayed in California and decided to live like an ordinary American in a middle-class suburb. Lazarenko showed no desire to return to Ukraine, despite the entourage of Yanukovych offering him a guarantee of safe return in exchange for testimony against Tymoshenko.

>>> 3. The Green Party of Ukraine − The Harbinger of Zelensky’s Future Victory

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Table of contents

• The Comedian’s Rise
• Lazarenko, Who Showed the Way to All
• The Green Party of Ukraine − The Harbinger of Zelensky’s Future Victory
• The Elimination of the “Against All” Option
• Andriy Danilko Could Have Been in Zelensky’s Place
• Leonid Chernovetsky − The Most Famous Ukrainian Populist Before Zelensky
• Kolomoisky Enters the Media Market
• Meeting with Zelensky
• Poroshenko Makes a Fatal Mistake
• Lyashko, Avakov, and a President on Shaky Ground
• Kolomoisky Declares War on Poroshenko
• Why Zelensky?
• Vakarchuk, Who Could Have Spoiled Everything but Didn’t
• Pre-election Promises and Features of Zelensky’s Electoral Campaign
• Did Poroshenko Have a Chance to Defeat Zelensky?
• The Weakness of Political Institutions − One of the Reasons for Zelensky’s Victory
• Zelensky’s Voters − Who Are They?
• Zelensky and Portnov
• On Guard for Kolomoisky’s Interests
• The Olympics and Love for Money
• The Big Construction − The Heist of the Century from Ukraine’s Budget
• Dubious Benefits for Oligarchs
• How Zelensky Fought the Coronavirus
• Against Biden, in Favor of Trump and Russia
• The PrivatBank Case: The First Contradictions Between Zelensky and Kolomoisky
• Kolomoisky and Prison
• The Failed Megaprojects of the President
• Pressure on Independent Media
• Reasons for the Conflict with Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko
• Why Putin Attacked Ukraine
• Zelensky’s Father Triggers a Chain Reaction
• The Perfect Moment for Putin
• The Russian Scenario Explained
• The Final Preparations for War
• The Kremlin’s Ultimatum
• Kazakhstan, the Olympics, and a Casus Belli
• Putin Issues Another Ultimatum, Now to Ukraine
• Why Wasn’t Zelensky Preparing for War? The Answer is Simple
• Person Number 2
• The Secret Meeting in Oman
• The Theory of Yermak’s Betrayal
• And So the War Began…
• The Bucha Massacre, Changing the Character of the War
• What Really Happened in the South
• How Kharkiv Was Saved from Occupation
• The Secret Advisor on Blowing Up Bridges
• The Bakanov Case
• The Mariupol Tragedy − Europe’s Largest Catastrophe of the 21st Century
• The Fate of the Captives
• Autumn 2022: An Unexpected Success of the Ukrainian Army
• 2023: Deterioration of the Situation on the Front
• How Could the War in Ukraine End?
• Corruption During War: Money Over Fear
• Mythologizing Zelensky’s Role in the War
• Zelensky Has Encountered a New Problem − General Zaluzhny
• Positive Achievements and Missed Opportunities