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Surprisingly, Poroshenko had a good chance to remain president for a second term, even considering that Kolomoisky’s media holding was actively working for Zelensky’s victory. The problem was not in resources – the problem was in the wrongly chosen strategy.

The first reason why Poroshenko lost was that his information TV channels “Pryamiy” and “5 kanal” had low ratings. Once, during the first Maidan in 2004, “5 kanal” played a decisive role in delivering truthful information to Ukrainians. But since then, the popularity of channels that broadcast news and interviews around the clock had waned. Moreover, unlike in 2004, Poroshenko no longer had a monopoly on this television format. Alongside his channels, several other information channels were broadcasting in Ukraine: “112 Ukraine”, “Espreso”, NewsOne, and “NASH”.

Simply put, there were too many news broadcasts, and Ukrainians returned to the traditional entertainment format with TV shows, movies, and evening news. Poroshenko had time to change the situation. He could have purchased high-rating content from the West and create a major nationalwide channel based on his two channels, which could compete with “1+1” and ICTV. However, the former president was for some reason fixated on information broadcasting and did not fully understand the power that high TV ratings gave his competitors.

Kolomoisky spent between $50 million to $100 million annually on “1+1”. Poroshenko, whose wealth exceeded $1 billion, was either not ready to spend such an amount or did not consider it reasonable. This was the first problem. It’s impossible to win elections when your opponent has a multiple advantage in financial and media resources.

The second reason for Poroshenko’s defeat was the incorrectly chosen electoral campaign strategy. He focused his activity on national-patriotic slogans. While generally correct for the country’s development, they were, to put it delicately, not very relevant for many voters, especially in the South and East of Ukraine. In other words, Poroshenko couldn’t reach a housewife from Mariupol with his ideas. Additionally, he lost the battle for the youth. His election rhetoric of “Army, Language, Faith” did not find enthusiasm among the youth, who, unlike in many other countries, are predominantly apolitical in Ukraine.

Petro Poroshenko could have corrected everything if, instead of national-patriotic slogans, he had chosen a rhetoric closer to the broad electorate. By focusing on his achievements (securing visa-free travel rights for Ukrainians to the countries of the European Union, more than 30 months of stable economic growth), he could have promised Ukraine’s accession to the European Union. That is, “I have already achieved visa-free entry to the EU for you, now I will achieve EU membership for Ukraine and will be able to significantly improve the quality of your life”.

Clearly, even if Petro Poroshenko had chosen this winning strategy, without a nationalwide channel, he still would not have been able to beat Zelensky, who was supported by the richest and most influential oligarchs in Ukraine. Nevertheless, Zelensky had a bunch of disadvantages. Egregious incompetence, Ukrainophobic jokes, and ties with Kolomoisky could have destroyed him. Zelensky was lucky that there was no one to destroy him. Poroshenko had all the necessary financial resources for victory, but he did not understand what Kolomoisky had known for a long time. Control over media resources allows for the shaping of necessary public opinion.

>>> 16. The Weakness of Political Institutions − One of the Reasons for Zelensky’s Victory

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Volodymyr Zelensky’s electoral campaign started long before he registered as a presidential candidate. Starting from 2015, the Kolomoisky-owned TV channel “1+1” began a campaign to discredit the authorities. Unlike during Yanukovych’s time, when journalists explained bad news with objective circumstances or mistakes by local officials, now the country’s problems were more often attributed to mistakes or poor performance of the central government— the government, deputies, and the president.

An important role in discrediting Zelensky’s main competitor was played by the entertainment show “Evening Kvartal”. It aired every Saturday evening and always had high ratings. Before the 2019 presidential election, the premiere shows of “Evening Kvartal” were watched by 17.5% of the Ukrainian TV audience, several million viewers.

It is interesting to compare how Zelensky’s show parodied presidents Yanukovych and Poroshenko during the times they both held the highest office in the country. Yanukovych was portrayed by the comedians of “Evening Kvartal” mainly as an uneducated man “from the people”, who sometimes reads poorly or does not know something. In contrast, Poroshenko was depicted as an alcoholic and a corrupt official. The difference is not so hard to understand. If an illiterate person can evoke sympathy from the viewers, then a corrupt official, stealing the people’s money, only evokes negative emotions.

Alongside discrediting Poroshenko, which lasted on “1+1” almost until the election day, political technologists started a PR campaign for Zelensky as a future candidate. A key role here was played by the TV series “Servant of the People”. Volodymyr Zelensky portrayed an honest and poor history teacher who rides a bicycle and eventually becomes the President of Ukraine.

In any other country, such a series might have remained just a popular TV product, like, for example, “Game of Thrones”, “The Walking Dead”, or any other. But it’s important to consider the specificity of the Ukrainian media market. By 2017, there was already an apparent consensus among oligarchs, who agreed with Kolomoisky’s proposal to promote the television comedian Zelensky for president. Therefore, instead of leaving him in the realm of variety satire, journalists of oligarchic channels raced to discuss Volodymyr Zelensky’s political future. This technology heated the society to the inevitability that the comedian would inevitably win the upcoming elections.

If you model a similar situation in the USA, just imagine that three nationalwide channels (NBC, CBS, and ABC) regularly discuss the possibility of Kanye West running for president for a year and a half. They do not criticize the singer for his incompetence and scandalous statements. At the same time, they form an opinion among voters that only Kanye can save America from crisis. And finally, Kanye West wins the election.

Volodymyr Zelensky’s official registration as a presidential candidate took place on January 21, 2019. From that moment, a new stage of his campaign began—two months of unrestrained populism and blatant lies. Following the populist tradition, the comedian positioned himself as a non-systemic candidate who rose against corrupt old politicians. However, he did not have a clear electoral program. There was only a set of vague theses that could be described as “for all that’s good and against all that’s bad”.

What did Zelensky promise? For example, in his program, he guaranteed that “a young family will have only one worry – to choose an apartment in the city or a country house”, that in Ukraine “fireworks will be shot only at weddings and birthdays”, that in the future there will be no ads for “Work in Poland”, and in Poland, there will appear ads for “Work in Ukraine”.

Zelensky also promised a wide application of popular referendums to pass laws, reducing utility tariffs for the underprivileged, zero tolerance for corruption at all levels, and assured that he is entering politics for only one term. What was missing in the program were explanations of the financial sources from which all these promises would be implemented.

The peak of lies by Zelensky could be seen on his pre-election billboards. One of them published a brilliant and simple phrase: “The end of the era of poverty on April 21, 2019”. Another one stated: “Report a corrupt official – receive 10%”. Obviously, all these were empty words. Ukrainians did not see any end of the era of poverty after Zelensky’s victory. And there was not a single case when someone received 10% of the confiscated property from a corrupt official.

In his few polished interviews with pre-agreed questions, Volodymyr Zelensky presented voters with an ideally optimistic picture of the future. He would definitely end the war in Donbas because it’s enough just to stop shooting. And in general, the war continues only because it benefits Petro Poroshenko.

He also promised to definitely sell all presidential planes, not to block roads with his motorcade, and to transfer state residences for children’s summer camps. All these promises remained empty words. After Zelensky’s victory, it turned out that presidential planes are needed because the head of state cannot be late. For the same reason, streets continued to be blocked before the president’s motorcade passed. The transfer of official residences to children was partial − indeed, children live and rest in these country houses, but these are Zelensky’s children.

For those who still doubted the comedian’s competence, they prepared the slogan “it can’t get worse”. This promise was first made by Zelensky himself in Odesa on February 18, 2019. Later, after the elections, on May 7, 2019, the same saying that “it can’t get worse” was repeated by Ihor Kolomoisky in an interview with the Bihus Info project. He even frankly added that Volodymyr Zelensky’s presidency is an experiment over the country.

The electoral campaign of the future president-comedian can be divided into three stages:

1. Discrediting the main competitor in the elections.
2. Creating an illusion around one’s persona using the TV series “Servant of the People” and a favorable atmosphere in oligarchic media.
3. Distributing populist promises without explanations of how they can be implemented.

A feature of Zelensky’s presidential campaign was that he was always protected from unexpected questions. He refused to appear on political talk shows and participate in debates in the traditional format. From the day of registering as a candidate until the day of voting, Zelensky gave only a couple of interviews to loyal journalists. No one, not even foreign journalists, could ask him a question that could compromise or show Zelensky in an unfavorable light.

Ukrainians did not choose a politician. They were presented with an illusion, unreal for any democratic country, in which voters elect as president of their country their favorite TV hero.

>>> 15. Did Poroshenko Have a Chance to Defeat Zelensky?

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Representatives of show business and famous athletes have been involved in Ukrainian politics long before Zelensky. Back in 1998, the famous footballer Oleh Blokhin became a member of parliament, and in 2006, the Eurovision winner, singer Ruslana Lyzhychko, became a deputy of the Verkhovna Rada. A year later, in the snap elections of 2007, the leader of the rock band “Okean Elzy” Svyatoslav Vakarchuk entered the parliament.

Like the Green Party, non-system politicians from among athletes and musicians did not distinguish themselves and no one remembers their legislative initiatives. Blokhin caught the attention of journalists only because, during his parliamentary activity, he changed factions five times, even becoming a communist at one point. Ruslana Lyzhychko was in the Verkhovna Rada for just a year. In 2007, after the dissolution of the parliament, snap elections were announced in which she did not participate. Svyatoslav Vakarchuk, however, made an unconventional move: a year after receiving the deputy’s certificate, he publicly announced his resignation.

Vakarchuk cited “continuous inter-party and intra-party disputes, which demoralize society within the country and undermine its authority” as the main reason for his resignation. He then delved into philosophy: “The only way to be oneself is to leave. Staying means running away for me.”

Surprisingly, voters liked Vakarchuk’s act. People understood it in the sense that the artist stands above political intrigues and was forced to leave politics to not participate in this dirt.

After resigning his deputy powers, Vakarchuk returned to his musical career, released several albums, and went on tour. He also periodically commented on political news on his Twitter in a somewhat lofty style, as if trying on the role of a spiritual leader. However, his philosophical statements appealed to voters. Over the years, Svyatoslav Vakarchuk has cultivated an image of an “honest patriot, sincerely concerned for Ukraine.” And most importantly, in the eyes of a significant number of Ukrainians, he was considered a non-system politician, not like the others.

In September 2017, rumors began to circulate that Vakarchuk might return to politics. The news that the singer was going to Stanford as a visiting lecturer for the fall semester sparked this speculation. Simultaneously with lecturing, Vakarchuk was to study as part of the course “Development of Ukrainian Leaders.”

As you can imagine, the title of this educational course worried many in Ukraine, primarily Kolomoisky and Zelensky, for whom the charismatic musician could shuffle all the cards. In case of his participation in the presidential elections, Vakarchuk could take many votes of the protest electorate, which Zelensky heavily counted on. Moreover, Svyatoslav Vakarchuk’s popularity could altogether question Zelensky’s victory.

After returning from America, Svyatoslav Vakarchuk began to be included in presidential ratings, although he publicly stated in April 2018 that he had no political ambitions. Despite this, the intrigue around the possible participation of the singer in the presidential election remained practically until the start of the election campaign.

In May-June 2019, after Zelensky’s victory, Kolomoisky revealed in an interview that in March 2017, he and Zelensky, after having a little drink late at night, called Vakarchuk. According to the oligarch, they asked the singer if he was ready to support Zelensky in the presidential elections. Although, in reality, this duo was worried about something else: whether Vakarchuk himself would participate in the elections as a candidate for the highest office. During this conversation, Vakarchuk was sleepy and did not answer the question.

On June 26, 2018, sociological survey results showed that Zelensky and Vakarchuk had practically the same chances of winning. As for the incumbent president, Poroshenko had the highest anti-rating among the first-tier politicians.

Three days later, a worried Volodymyr Zelensky published an open video appeal to the leader of “Okean Elzy,” Svyatoslav Vakarchuk, on his Instagram. In it, the comedian publicly asked the musician if he was ready to join him.

Zelensky’s concerns were entirely understandable. After a prolonged campaign to discredit Poroshenko, he no longer posed a danger to him, but Vakarchuk could spoil everything. Election modeling showed that the singer could realistically make it to the second round with Zelensky instead of Poroshenko. And if that happened, Vakarchuk would defeat Zelensky in the second round.

This whole story ended with Svyatoslav Vakarchuk not nominating himself for the presidential election and not supporting any candidate. However, three months after Zelensky’s victory, the leader of “Okean Elzy” suddenly changed his mind and decided to return to politics after all. In the snap parliamentary elections in July 2019, Vakarchuk’s party “Holos” received 5.82% of the voters’ votes and brought 20 deputies into parliament.

This time, Vakarchuk lasted in parliament even less than a year. In June 2020, he decided again to resign from his deputy powers. He cited the desire to implement a “large educational project” as his reason for this decision. Politics, supposedly, only interfered with these plans. However, over the following four years, no one saw the “large educational project” of Svyatoslav Vakarchuk.

>>> 14. Pre-election Promises and Features of Zelensky’s Electoral Campaign

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It can be confidently asserted that already in 2016, Kolomoisky began preparing Zelensky for the presidential elections. The initial ideas about this emerged even in 2015 when the ratings of the first season of the TV series “Servant of the People” showed that Ukrainians very positively received the fairy tale about an honest history teacher who became president.

But why Zelensky specifically? From the perspective of political technologists, he was a very risky candidate. He was incompetent, had no experience in government, and had never held an elected position. Moreover, in his shows, he used sarcastic jokes regarding Ukraine as a state and mocked Ukrainians. For example, in September 2016, during a performance in Jurmala (Latvia), Zelensky compared Ukraine to an actress from German adult films, “ready to take it in any amount from any side.”

It’s noteworthy that almost all jokes in which Volodymyr Zelensky mocked Ukrainians on stage, while wearing their national costumes, were written by ethnic Russian Valeriy Zhidkov. A native of Russia’s Tambov who moved to Kyiv in 2003, Zhidkov later began commenting on Ukrainian politics, expressing opposition to Ukraine’s joining NATO and the European Union. A couple of years later, Zhidkov became an advisor to the head of the Security Service of Ukraine. This happened after the new head of state, Zelensky, appointed his childhood friend Ivan Bakanov as the head of the SBU. Zelensky and Bakanov lived in the same apartment building during their school years.

Considering all this, in a normal democratic society, Volodymyr Zelensky would never have become a presidential candidate. He would have been disqualified after the scandal in Jurmala. But in Ukraine, public opinion was shaped by TV channels owned by oligarchs. Journalists working on these channels were very good at sensing their employer’s moods. Hence, there was no criticism of Zelensky on television; it did not reach the voters.

Social networks in Ukraine had a limited audience. Angry posts criticizing Zelensky were read by thousands or at best tens of thousands of Ukrainians. Meanwhile, nationalwide TV channels covered a million-strong audience. Importantly, they influenced social groups to which critical posts on Facebook and Twitter simply did not reach: pensioners and housewives.

Logically, Zelensky was a very problematic presidential candidate. If Kolomoisky wanted to retaliate against Poroshenko, he should have chosen a more experienced candidate, who would have been easier to sell to voters as a real alternative to the incumbent president. However, the oligarch was so confident in his powers that he bet on the scandalous comedian becoming the country’s president. Although, it’s quite possible that he simply had no more suitable candidate to entrust with such a delicate job of overthrowing the detested Poroshenko and protecting his own business interests.

The level of communication between the oligarch and Zelensky at the time is indicated by the fact that, according to investigative journalists of the “Schemes” project, from February 2017 to the end of 2018, the comedian flew at least 13 times on private jets to Geneva and Tel Aviv, where Kolomoisky was then residing. In every second trip, he was accompanied by the oligarch’s lawyer Andriy Bohdan, who later became the head of the President’s Office. In December 2018, one of the trips included the head of the “Servant of the People” party Ivan Bakanov, the future head of the SBU. Sometimes Zelensky was accompanied by Kolomoisky’s business partners: Gennadiy Bogolyubov, the Surkis brothers, Timur Mindich.

Kolomoisky’s choice was likely emotional. He simply had a fondness for Zelensky. Possibly, the choice was influenced to some extent by the factor of nationality. Zelensky and Kolomoisky are both Jewish, as are the owners of two other nationalwide TV channels: Viktor Pinchuk and Dmytro Firtash. During the election campaign, all three channels (1+1, ICTV, and Inter) in their news positively covered everything related to Zelensky. No criticism of the comedian. No mention of his incompetence and populist promises.

From the perspective of the average Ukrainian, Volodymyr Zelensky’s nationality was more of a minus than a plus. For centuries, the relationship between Ukrainians and Jews has been quite complicated. And anti-Semitism at the household level in Ukraine is still quite prevalent. Kolomoisky indeed took a risk by offering Ukrainian voters his protégé. But the main problem with Zelensky was not that he was Jewish but that he was completely unfit for the position he aspired to.

>>> 13. Vakarchuk, Who Could Have Spoiled Everything but Didn’t

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The conflict surrounding “Ukrtransnafta” might have been considered exhausted if Poroshenko hadn’t touched upon Kolomoisky’s interests in the banking sector. PrivatBank, which was 92% owned by Kolomoisky and his business partner Gennadiy Bogolyubov, was the largest Ukrainian bank. More than half of the adult population in Ukraine had accounts there. However, in 2015, the bank faced a minor issue.

The tripling depreciation of the national currency, following Yanukovych’s flight and the onset of war in Donbas, severely impacted the banking system. To avoid uncontrollable bank bankruptcies, the state regulator began cleaning up the financial market in 2015. During the year, 33 banks, which had almost no assets or were involved in money laundering schemes, lost their licenses. The National Bank also increased the reserve requirements for commercial banks.

An audit of PrivatBank revealed that it not only significantly exceeded the norm of insider loans (the bank loaned customer funds to Kolomoisky’s companies) but also needed recapitalization amounting to 113 billion hryvnias (about $5 billion). As of January 1, 2016, more than 80% of all PrivatBank’s loans were issued to companies affiliated with Kolomoisky. The absolute majority of these companies were shell companies without liquid assets for collateral.

The bank’s owners had 1.5 years to meet the regulator’s requirements. As Valeriya Gontareva, the former head of the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU), recalls, not much money was needed – about 3-4 billion hryvnias ($150-180 million). The main requirement of the National Bank was the re-registration of issued loans from shell firms to real companies with liquid assets instead of air. By April 2016, real collaterals worth 31 billion hryvnias needed to be transferred to PrivatBank’s balance sheet.

Instead of meeting the regulator’s conditions, Kolomoisky maximally delayed the negotiations. According to Minister of Finance Oleksandr Danyliuk, the oligarch proposed the state to partially buy the bank, maintain the old management, and provide guarantees against criminal prosecution. He also asked for a few months to resolve the problems.

Eventually, it became clear that Kolomoisky was not intending to increase capitalization or bring in liquid assets as collateral for previously issued loans. On December 18, 2016, the NBU declared PrivatBank insolvent, on December 21, all 100% of the bank’s shares were transferred to state ownership, and on December 23, a new management began work.

Three years later, explaining the reason for the nationalization of PrivatBank, Igor Kolomoisky blatantly lied. Since he couldn’t admit that his bank issued insider loans to shell companies and lacked the necessary reserves, the oligarch concocted his version of events. According to him, Poroshenko nationalized the bank because he wanted to control the “1+1” TV channel. But the president was mistaken, since PrivatBank owned a blocking stake in “1+1 Production,” not the TV channel itself, which holds the license for television broadcasting.

The outcome of this whole story was that Kolomoisky harbored a significant grudge against Poroshenko and still accuses the former president of taking away his business. On the other hand, it’s impossible to forget that the oligarch not only grossly violated the rules of conducting banking business but also never returned a large portion of the loans previously issued through PrivatBank, totaling more than $5 billion. By the time of nationalization, this figure was roughly equivalent to the bank’s value.

>>> 12. Why Zelensky?

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