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In November and December 2021, Vladimir Putin, his diplomats, and propagandists conducted an information campaign that was supposed to provide Russian citizens with a legitimate explanation for the upcoming invasion of Ukraine. Russians were meant to understand that the forthcoming war was not aggressive on Russia’s part but, on the contrary, Russia was defending itself against aggression from the West and the Nazi regime of Ukraine. A key element of Putin’s information campaign was a list of demands that he presented to the leadership of the USA and other NATO countries.

On November 18, speaking at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vladimir Putin accused Ukraine of “demonstratively failing” to fulfill the Minsk agreements, and France and Germany of facilitating this. Putin also outlined the content of future demands for the first time: “The question needs to be raised about achieving serious long-term security guarantees for Russia.”

On December 1, during the ceremony of receiving diplomatic credentials from foreign ambassadors, Putin stated that obtaining “security guarantees” from the West was the top priority for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “We need legal, juridical guarantees, since our Western colleagues did not fulfill their corresponding verbal commitments.”

On December 2, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov presented the first demands to the West in Stockholm. He first declared that “Ukraine is being militarily pumped up” and “the terrible scenario of military confrontation is returning.” Lavrov then moved on to threats: “ignoring Russia’s legitimate concerns will have the most serious consequences.” Although Russia “does not want any conflicts,” “every state has the right to choose ways to ensure its legitimate interests in the sphere of security.”

On December 10, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a press release proposing to cancel the decision of the NATO Bucharest summit in 2008, which stated that “Ukraine and Georgia will become members of NATO.”

On December 15, Putin handed over to Karen Donfried, Assistant Secretary of State of the USA, proposals on “security guarantees” that Russia wants to receive from Washington. Two days later, on December 17, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs published on its website a draft of the future document titled “Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Security Guarantees.”

The future document was of an ultimatum nature. Specifically, it demanded the USA to refrain from creating military bases in the countries of the former USSR and to cease any military cooperation with them. Moreover, the United States was to not only refrain from further NATO expansion to the east but also withdraw all its armed forces from the territories of countries that became NATO members after 1997. This list included not only the Baltic states but almost all of Eastern Europe, including Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary.

Of course, the text of the ultimatum deliberately contained conditions that were impossible to meet. Putin was preparing to quickly capture Kyiv, and this document was needed only to have a reason to start the war.

>>> 36. Kazakhstan, the Olympics, and a Casus Belli

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In March 2021, American intelligence noticed a massive deployment of Russian troops near the borders of Ukraine, numbering up to 120,000 personnel. According to John Kirby, the spokesperson for the United States Department of Defense, this was the largest concentration of Russian military forces near Ukraine since 2014. The unexpected activity of the Russians forced the United States European Command (EUCOM) to change the assessment level of the situation between Ukraine and Russia from a “potential crisis” to a “potential crisis that could occur in the near future” at the end of March 2021.

On April 13, 2021, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu for the first time acknowledged the troop movements to the borders of Ukraine. He stated that for the purpose of checking combat readiness following the winter training period, two combined arms armies and three airborne forces units were additionally deployed to the western borders of the Russian Federation.

According to an analysis by the Ukrainian National Institute for Strategic Studies, published in September 2021, the spring activity of the Russian Armed Forces near the borders of Ukraine was explained by their practicing the possibility of a sudden strike to block Ukraine’s access to the Black Sea. Or, at least, they were preparing to implement a plan to encircle Ukrainian troops in eastern Ukraine. For this, the Russian army had to strike from two sides: from the northern border and from Crimea.

Experts believe that Putin decided to conduct large-scale maneuvers not only to train his army but also to send a signal to the new President Biden about his desire to negotiate. He achieved this: at the end of May 2021, the presidents of Russia and the United States agreed to meet in Geneva. The talks took place on June 16, and sources in the White House called them “constructive.”

According to The Washington Post, the first alarm bell rang a month after the meeting in Geneva: in July 2021, when Putin’s article “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” was published on the official Kremlin website. Mostly, the content of this essay consisted of a brief interpretation of history and assessment of the relations between Russia and Ukraine. However, the text then included a message that Soviet leaders had transferred territories to Ukraine that historically did not belong to it, and therefore Russia was essentially robbed. At the end of the article, Putin began to make veiled threats: “We will never allow our historical territories to be used against Russia. And to those who would attempt such a thing, I want to say that by doing so, they will destroy their country.”

American analysts did not like the tone of the author of this article, prompting intelligence to step up its activities in Russia. The result was the conclusion that Russia was indeed preparing for a full-scale war with Ukraine. President Biden was informed of Putin’s plans in October 2021.

Zelensky received the first information that Putin was preparing to attack Ukraine a few weeks after Biden was informed. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken informed the Ukrainian president of the Kremlin’s intentions during a personal meeting at the climate change conference in Glasgow. This happened in early November 2021.

Less than two weeks after the meeting in Glasgow, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba and Head of the President’s Office Andriy Yermak visited Washington. Recalling the visit, Kuleba mentioned that a high-ranking American official greeted them with a cup of coffee and a smile at the U.S. State Department.

“Guys, dig trenches,” the official began. “When we smiled in response, the official said: ‘I’m serious. Start digging trenches… You will be attacked. A major attack, and you must prepare for it.”

According to Kuleba, he and Yermak asked for details, but “there were none.” Later, the Ukrainian Foreign Minister even claimed that the Americans did not provide them with specific intelligence data “up to the last 4-5 days before the invasion began.”

Kuleba’s statement should be taken with great skepticism since as early as December 2021, three months before the invasion, Putin’s plan was published on the website of the German tabloid newspaper Bild and was actively discussed not only by experts but also by journalists and bloggers.

Comparing the map of the likely advance of Russian troops published on December 4 in Bild and the real directions of the invasion into Ukraine, which began on February 24, 2022, they are almost identical. Attempts to encircle Kyiv from two sides, including from the direction of Belarus, the attack from Crimea, the strike towards Kharkiv, the attack in the occupied part of the Luhansk region, and the strike on Volnovakha were confirmed. The only difference between the two plans was the absence of a naval landing in Odesa. The Russians did not dare to undertake such a complex and risky operation.

Thus, three months before the war began, Putin’s plan was already posted on the internet. This means that the Office of Zelensky was familiar with this plan, at least in November, four months before the invasion. There was enough time to prepare, but nothing was done.

And what about Putin and the Americans? It would be a mistake to think that President Biden’s administration simply watched as Russia prepared to attack Ukraine. At the end of October 2021, the White House requested a meeting between CIA Director William Burns and Putin.

On November 2, Burns flew to Moscow and was taken to the Kremlin office of Yuri Ushakov, Putin’s foreign policy advisor and former ambassador to the U.S. The Russian president refused a personal meeting and decided to speak with the CIA director by phone.

Initially, the Kremlin master complained about NATO expansion, the security threat to Russia, and Ukraine’s illegitimate leadership.

“He spoke very disparagingly about President Zelensky as a political leader,” Burns recalls.

After listening to Putin’s brief lecture, Burns conveyed the White House’s message: “The United States knows what you have planned, and if you invade Ukraine, you will pay a huge price.” He also left a letter from Biden, in which he confirmed the extremely negative consequences for Russia of any attack on Ukraine.

In the conversation with Burns, Putin did not deny the accuracy of intelligence data indicating the preparation of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. According to the CIA director, Putin had not yet made an irreversible decision to start the war at that time, but his views on Ukraine had hardened, and his appetite for risk had increased.

How did the Americans learn about Putin’s decision to start the war? At the end of 2023, interesting information circulated among Russian military bloggers. It turned out that the commander of the Russian Airborne Forces, General Mikhail Teplinsky, from October 2021 to January 2022, actively sold shares of Russian companies he owned. This suggests that in October or even at the end of September 2021, Putin informed senior Russian generals about the inevitability of war with Ukraine. Obviously, at this stage, when at least 10-20 people knew about the impending war, there was a leak, which reached American intelligence.

>>> 35. The Kremlin’s Ultimatum

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The scenario for the capture of Ukraine was envisioned as a special operation, similar to the suppression of the “Prague Spring” in 1968. This is evidenced by the military plans of the Russian army, which, along with prisoners, fell into the hands of Ukrainian military a few weeks after the war began.

On February 21, 2022, three days before the invasion, the command of the 34th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade of the Russian army, which was to advance from Crimea, briefed the personnel on the plan for “performing special (combat) tasks on the territory of foreign states.” According to this document, the Russians intended to capture Mykolaiv and land troops near Odesa within five days. By the ninth day, they aimed to capture Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi and reach the border with Romania. And by the morning of the 11th day of the war, reach the border with Moldova and establish their posts there. Naturally, this plan did not anticipate any prolonged battles with the Ukrainian army.

A similar “blitzkrieg” plan existed for the direction of Kyiv. According to the First Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine, Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk, the Russians intended to capture Kyiv within three to five days. They planned to use special operations forces and airborne troops to seize the Gostomel and Vasylkiv airports near Kyiv. Simultaneously, the enemy aimed to destroy the air defense around the capital, command posts of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Guard, and critical infrastructure objects through missile and air strikes.

After capturing the airports, additional forces were to be continuously landed on their runways using military transport aircraft. Then, the Russian army intended to capture the government district in the center of Kyiv, eliminate or arrest the country’s leadership, and establish a puppet pro-Russian regime in Ukraine. Putin’s triumph would have been a military parade of the Russian army on Kyiv’s main street − Khreshchatyk.

Most likely, the Kremlin planned to return former President Yanukovych to power in Ukraine and declare all legislative acts adopted by the Verkhovna Rada after his flight on February 20, 2014, invalid. The District Administrative Court of Kyiv, which had suddenly decided to consider Yanukovych’s lawsuit on the illegality of his dismissal a few weeks before the war began, was expected to provide invaluable assistance to the occupiers. Obviously, the court was supposed to create a legitimate basis for the restoration of the fugitive president’s power.

Next, Yanukovych was to sign several agreements with Russia: recognizing Russian sovereignty over Crimea and Donbas, and a military and political alliance between Ukraine and Russia. It is quite possible that Putin had additional conditions, about which we do not know. And finally, after a few weeks or months, Yanukovych was to resign and transfer power to Viktor Medvedchuk. During this time, the old composition of the Verkhovna Rada was to appoint Medvedchuk as its speaker. According to the Ukrainian Constitution, the speaker of the parliament becomes the acting president in case of his resignation or death.

Putin and Medvedchuk’s further plans are unknown to us. Most likely, they planned the full integration of Ukraine into Russia, similar to the unification of East and West Germany. A separate scenario was being prepared for the western Ukrainian regions.

It is evident that there was also a Plan B if the Ukrainian army continued to resist and, after the fall of Kyiv, began to retreat to Western Ukraine. Although we do not know this plan, there is unofficial information that the front line was supposed to stop at the administrative borders of the western Ukrainian regions. This is explained by two reasons. First, Putin was allegedly frightened by the prospect of battling a new “Banderite” underground movement for many years, as happened under Stalin in the 1940s and 50s. Second, the population of Western Ukraine, having far fewer cultural ties with Russians, would have hindered the rapid Russification of the rest of the population.

Western Ukraine was likely to become a Russian protectorate similar to the “Vichy regime” in France. However, who was supposed to take on the role of Marshal Pétain remains a mystery.

There are substantial reasons to believe that in the event of capturing Ukraine, complete assimilation among Russians was prepared for the Ukrainians. Socially active citizens involved in pro-Ukrainian activities were expected to face, at a minimum, arrest. The implementation of this scenario could be observed in the occupied territories of the South and East of Ukraine. The first thing the Russians started in the captured cities and villages was the search and detention of citizens with a pro-Ukrainian stance. Then, a few weeks later, Ukrainian books, including fiction, were removed from school and city libraries. The school education process was switched to Russian language and textbooks.

Unlike Soviet leaders, who guaranteed Ukrainians minimal national rights, Putin has repeatedly stated that Lenin’s idea was mistaken. The current President of Russia has long lived in an imperial delusion, in which Ukrainians as a separate nation simply do not exist. Therefore, it is entirely understandable that the destruction of Ukrainian books and Ukrainian-language education logically fits into this theory, as the presence of literature in one’s own language is one of the signs of a nation.

>>> 34. The Final Preparations for War

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As is well known, a driver consuming alcohol can lead to a car accident. Probably, no one would deny this statement. But if you drink 100 or 150 grams of brandy, vodka, or some other strong drink half an hour before driving, it does not mean that you will definitely get into an accident. No, a combination of conditions must arise that leads to a traffic accident.

Suppose a drunk driver is a risk that accounts for 20% of this sum. Speeding − another 20%, poor visibility on the road − 10%, slippery roads − 20%, and finally, the sudden appearance of another road user − the last 30%. That’s it! Bingo! Four or even three components are enough for you to get into an accident. But if you have only one component, and the other conditions are absent, then you are likely to make it home safely.

At the time of writing, the war continues, and martial law in Ukraine imposes certain restrictions on criticizing the actions of the authorities. Therefore, Ukrainian society does not fully understand the reasons for the Russian invasion and the catastrophic events of the first month of the war. The closure of Medvedchuk’s TV channels is only one of the reasons why Putin decided to attack Ukraine. And not even the main one.

Zelensky could not only shut down pro-Russian TV channels − he could even give Medvedchuk a life sentence for treason with the help of his pocket judges. And even then, the war would not necessarily have started. But there is one condition: if only Ukraine had a strong army and was ready for defense.

Subsequent events showed that the incompetent actions of the Ukrainian president and the fabulous corruption with state finances were precisely the mechanism that let the genie out of the bottle. Putin and his subordinates closely watched the situation in Ukraine. And, obviously, in the second half of 2020, the Russian leader decided to prepare for an attack. The closure of Medvedchuk’s TV channels only strengthened his confidence that this had to be done before Zelensky left office.

There is a whole complex of reasons why the war started. The first has already been mentioned. Putin missed the opportunity to influence Ukrainian politics by political means. The closure of television channels belonging to Viktor Medvedchuk drastically reduced the chances of pro-Russian forces in the next elections.

The next reason for the war is the failed preparation for defense. The state defense order for 2020 in Ukraine was disrupted. By the end of September 2020, the Ministry of Defense had not used more than 20 billion hryvnias for the purchase of weapons and equipment repair. For the first time in several years, the 2021 state budget reduced funding for the army. The government and the Minister of Defense of Ukraine appointed by Zelensky, Andriy Taran, cut or sabotaged army rearmament programs. The production program for “Vilkha” missiles was stopped. The state did not allocate funding for the Pavlohrad Chemical Plant, which produces rocket fuel. As a result, the plant was shut down, and 687 workers were laid off.

The catastrophic state of the Ukrainian army on the eve of the war is evidenced by the fact that for three years (2019 – 2022), the government did not purchase a single shell for the Armed Forces. Therefore, just a few days after the full-scale invasion, Ukraine was forced to ask Western countries for urgent help in supplying artillery shells. Before the war, the president and his entourage were much more interested in financing their megaproject “Big Construction”. Unlike the army, here the state generously allocated tens of billions of hryvnias to private companies.

The third reason is the fall of the pro-American government in Afghanistan. The lightning-fast victory of the Taliban and Kabul surrendered without a fight greatly inspired the Kremlin. Russian propagandists began to broadcast on their media platforms dreams of how Ukrainian officials would fight for seats on planes flying to the West from Boryspil. The scenario in which Zelensky’s power would collapse just as Ashraf Ghani’s government did was taken quite seriously in Moscow.

The fourth reason for the war is the gross errors of Russian intelligence in analyzing the situation in Ukraine. We do not know exactly what role intelligence data played in Putin’s decision. It is possible that some Russian analysts were skeptical about the possibility of repeating the Afghan scenario of 2021. But Putin decided to rely on the data he liked more. They suggested that Ukraine’s resistance would last no more than a few days.

Of course, Putin considered himself a great expert on the Ukrainian issue. But now it is clear to everyone that he made a mistake, not the first one. Both in 2004 during the first Maidan and in 2014 during the second Maidan, he underestimated the level of self-organization of Ukrainian society and stubbornly refused to take into account local specifics. Putin somehow always uses the Soviet template. He still thinks that the situation in Ukraine is similar to the Russian one, as it was decades ago in the times of the USSR.

Indeed, Ukrainians are very similar to Russians. However, there are significant differences, not only in mentality but, more importantly, in social relations. Over 30 years of independence, powerful civil and political institutions have emerged in Ukraine, preventing the establishment of authoritarianism and a return to the Russia-centric development model.

Putin underestimated the influence of Western Ukraine, which several times played the role of “Ukrainian Piedmont,” a catalyst for national revival, in the country’s history. He underestimated the role of Ukrainian churches (the Kyiv Patriarchate, which later transformed into the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, and the Greek Catholic Church). Putin did not pay attention to the presence in Ukraine of powerful democratic forces represented in parliament. Finally, he did not consider the influence of Ukrainian oligarchs.

All these reasons are absent in Russia. There is no region there where a quarter of the population lives and which completely rejects the Eurasian development vector. There is no hint of an independent public stance of the Russian Orthodox Church. And, of course, in Russia, the democratic opposition has long been unrepresented in parliament, and the oligarchs have clearly learned the rule not to play politics.

>>> 33. The Russian Scenario Explained

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Before the war began, the Kremlin paid significant attention to disinformation about the reasons for the attack on Ukraine. According to the rules of Russian propaganda, there must be a lot of lies. This is necessary to confuse the target audience. People should choose not between lies and truth, but between different versions of lies. This makes it harder for them to get to the real reasons or events.

Trying to explain the upcoming aggression against its neighbor, Putin offered his compatriots to believe in the scary American biolabs on Ukrainian territory, the rise of neo-Nazism, the need to protect the population of Donbas, NATO expansion, and even Ukraine’s attempts to create a nuclear bomb. A few days before the invasion, Russian special services staged several shellings of their territory supposedly by Ukraine. But this Gleiwitz incident was done so clumsily and shoddily that not even Russian Z-patriots believed it.

In fact, Putin’s decision to start a full-scale war was influenced by entirely different factors. The first (but not the main) of these was Zelensky’s victory in the presidential elections in April 2019.

The Kremlin really wanted Zelensky to win. President Poroshenko, despite all his flaws, consistently pursued a policy that Putin did not like. He strengthened the Ukrainian army, under him the economy grew for 30 consecutive months, he achieved autocephaly for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and visa-free travel for citizens to the European Union. If the situation continued at this pace, Ukraine could well receive a roadmap for joining the EU by the end of the second presidential term.

In anticipation of the presidential elections, in March 2019, the chief editor of the Russian radio station “Echo of Moscow,” Alexey Venediktov, stated that Putin is satisfied with any president of Ukraine who would make the country weaker.

“I understand that anyone but Poroshenko. In my opinion, speaking of our, pro-Russian candidate for president of Ukraine, we have Mr. Chaos. The more chaos, the weaker the candidate, the more Putin thinks it is beneficial for Russia. We do not have our own candidate: Tymoshenko, Zelensky, Boyko, some other people − it does not matter. Mr. Chaos satisfies us,” said Venediktov.

Of course, Zelensky’s victory itself was not one of the reasons for the war. But it created the necessary conditions. An incompetent president of Ukraine was Putin’s hope that Poroshenko’s policy towards Europe would, at the very least, slow down. It would also be desirable for the new president to improve relations with Russia. To begin with, it would be good for Ukraine to forget about Crimea and come to terms with the separatist authorities in Donbas.

The maximum program for Putin envisaged appointing Viktor Medvedchuk as the head of the government or the return to power of former President Viktor Yanukovych. Either way, but Venediktov was right: to begin with, the Russian leadership very much wanted the situation in Ukraine to worsen.

For some time, Putin waited. He hoped that he would somehow be able to expand the political influence of Ukrainian parties loyal to the Kremlin. For this, at the next parliamentary elections in Ukraine, pro-Russian parties had to get the percentage of votes that would allow them to claim participation in the parliamentary coalition. If this succeeded, then Medvedchuk could hope to become the speaker of the parliament or vice-premier. Putin really hoped to return representatives of pro-Russian forces to the executive power of Ukraine.

To strengthen Medvedchuk’s influence, Putin gifted his wife − former TV presenter Oksana Marchenko − the right to develop one of the three largest oil fields in Russia, the Gavrikovskoye field in the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug. According to Putin’s plan, Marchenko’s Cypriot company would extract oil in Russia, sell it, and use the proceeds to buy and finance TV channels in Ukraine.

For some time, this scheme worked successfully. Even under Poroshenko, Medvedchuk began to buy up information TV channels. In a relatively short time through front men, he became the owner of the television channels NewsOne, ZIK, and “112 Ukraine”. In November 2019, already under Zelensky, Medvedchuk opened two more TV channels: “First Independent” and UkrLive.

Notably, all pro-Russian media resources, including Medvedchuk’s channels, ruthlessly criticized Poroshenko before the presidential election and assessed Zelensky’s prospects quite neutrally. This continued after the new president was elected. The criticism of Poroshenko was meant to maximally reduce the percentage of his party in the upcoming parliamentary elections. Zelensky was still being observed, obviously, in the calculation of possible participation in a future coalition and government formation.

Everything changed on July 22, 2019, after the vote count in the snap elections to the Verkhovna Rada. The pro-Russian bloc of parties “Opposition Platform − For Life” got not so little: 13.05% of the votes. This allowed them to bring 43 deputies into parliament. However, Shariy’s party, another pro-Kremlin force, did not overcome the 5-percent barrier in the 2019 parliamentary elections, receiving only 2.23% of the votes.

The real triumphator of the snap parliamentary elections was the pro-presidential party “Servant of the People,” which for the first time in the history of Ukraine managed to form a mono-majority. Zelensky’s party received 43.16% of the votes. Together with deputies elected in single-mandate constituencies, this was enough to form a majority without the participation of other parties. This meant that Putin’s desire to influence the decisions of the Ukrainian government would not be realized, at least for the next 4 years.

Since Medvedchuk and Boyko no longer hoped to get positions in the government or even in the leadership of the parliament, pro-Russian TV channels began to gradually criticize the president. It is worth mentioning again that Zelensky is very sensitive to criticism. He simply hated any critical statements about himself, broadcasted from the TV channels of Poroshenko and Medvedchuk. But since Poroshenko belongs to the pro-Western opposition and has quite a high authority, including in Washington and European capitals, his media resources cannot be simply shut down, as somewhere in Venezuela or Azerbaijan. This would immediately cause a scandal and accusations of oppressing freedom of speech. The President of Ukraine, as we know, positions himself as a democratic leader.

But if the TV channels of the hated Poroshenko cannot be shut down, then this prohibition does not apply to Medvedchuk’s channels. Viktor Medvedchuk made a big mistake. He somehow began to think that his status as “Putin’s godfather” and the unofficial representative of the Kremlin in Ukraine gave him certain privileges that Zelensky would not dare to violate. But it turned out that the Ukrainian president is absolutely indifferent to this status.

Zelensky did not want to tolerate and watch how Medvedchuk’s propagandists systematically destroy his rating from their TV screens. The first year of his presidency, on the wave of fantastically high popularity among the people, he could still ignore this. However, criticism on TV screens was increasing, including news stories about corruption in power. The last straw was information that Zelensky’s father was very upset by journalists’ attacks on his son. Moreover, it was about Medvedchuk’s TV channels, which Olexandr Zelensky liked to watch until a certain time. There were even rumors that the president’s father had a heart attack because of this.

On February 2, 2021, the president initiated a decision by the National Security and Defense Council to impose sanctions against people’s deputy Taras Kozak, TV channels “112 Ukraine”, NewsOne, and ZIK. Kozak fell under sanctions because he was formally the owner of these TV channels, not Medvedchuk or his wife Oksana Marchenko. A similar ownership scheme existed for Poroshenko’s channel. Until 2021, “Pryamiy” was registered to the former head of the Kyiv City Administration, Volodymyr Makeenko, although Poroshenko actually managed everything.

It is interesting how the father of the Ukrainian president reacted to the sanctions and the shutdown of Medvedchuk’s TV channels. The next day, Olexandr Zelensky told journalists that he supports the ban on TV channels “112 Ukraine”, NewsOne, and ZIK, because their rhetoric does not correspond to reality.

“The way they pour dirt on him, there’s nothing like it in any country… They pour the dirtiest dirt… They say, for instance, corruption has increased sixfold. But you look at the international results − it’s risen by three ranks,” said the elder Zelensky.

The closure of Viktor Medvedchuk’s TV channels had far-reaching consequences. With his decision, Volodymyr Zelensky showed Putin that, unlike Poroshenko, he would not allow propagandists to destroy his rating and destabilize the political situation. Of course, the master of the Kremlin understood that the lack of media support puts an end to his plans to bring pro-Russian forces to power in Ukraine. In other words, Putin lost the last illusions that Medvedchuk could ever take a high post in the Ukrainian government.

Should pro-Russian TV channels have been closed? Of course, but only if you have a strong army and are ready for the consequences. It was long clear that Medvedchuk is a traitor, and his media projects are funded by Russia. But Zelensky hardly thought about the long-term consequences and definitely was not prepared for a possible escalation of military actions. Since the Ukrainian president lacked sufficient experience in international politics and surrounded himself with equally incompetent friends, he seemed to think that everything would somehow calm down. Zelensky’s logic was childishly simple and naive: war benefits no one, so Putin will not start it.

>>> 32. The Perfect Moment for Putin

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