Before the full-scale war began, Volodymyr Zelensky’s electoral prospects looked quite promising. Despite the fact that over three years of his leadership, the Ukrainian economy showed no signs of improvement, his main political rival − Petro Poroshenko − no longer posed a threat in elections. TV channels owned by oligarchs friendly to Zelensky carefully ensured that the former president appeared on air as seldom as possible. Lacking access to a broad audience, Poroshenko was unable to convey his ideas to most voters and could not shake off his low trust ratings among the populace. By that time, Yulia Tymoshenko was no longer considered a serious competitor, and the new generation of politicians were generally loners, lacking support from political parties or influential media resources. Everything was heading towards the next presidential elections following the pattern of 1999, when incumbent President Kuchma was provided with a convenient opponent − the communist leader Petro Symonenko. But now, Poroshenko was expected to play that role.
The main danger for Zelensky was an election scenario in which the opposition would rally around a charismatic politician with a low distrust rating. In 2004, such a presidential candidate was former Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko. Despite an information blockade and a discrediting campaign on national TV channels, Yushchenko almost immediately became the main favorite of the election. Not even widespread vote-rigging could prevent his victory.
Since Poroshenko had failed to rid himself of low voter ratings, a certain vacuum emerged in the opposition environment. Many understood that, despite the former president’s strong desire for a rematch after his 2019 election defeat, his chances of beating Zelensky were slim, especially when the government completely controlled national TV channels. The only chance to overthrow Zelensky was to replicate the 2004 election model. However, there was one problem: the president’s opponents had no charismatic politician in mind who could become the new Viktor Yushchenko.
Theoretically, such a candidate could have been a completely new figure from the intelligentsia: a scientist or famous writer who had not previously taken an active part in politics. Voters might have been attracted to such a character, considering that representatives of the scientific and creative intelligentsia had last actively participated in Ukrainian politics in the late 1980s. Against the backdrop of the former comedian’s silly jokes and his constant failures, this could create a favorable contrast between the incumbent president and the opposition candidate. Most importantly, it would be much harder to discredit a person with an unblemished reputation in the eyes of voters.
Everything changed with the onset of the full-scale war. Ukrainians immediately understood that only the military could save them from Russian occupation and, possibly, death. Since the nation’s hopes were directed towards the military, this immediately drew attention to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Valeriy Zaluzhny.
Before the war, 49-year-old Zaluzhny had appeared on news broadcasts several times and even participated in a political talk show. But he had no particular popularity before February 24, 2022.
As is known, before the war began, the Ukrainian army was critically undermanned. It lacked not just soldiers, but also ammunition. Nevertheless, even in such unfavorable conditions, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, under Zaluzhny’s command, managed to defeat the Russian army near Kyiv and protected the border city of Kharkiv from occupation.
Zaluzhny’s popularity significantly increased after the successful counteroffensive in the fall of 2022, when the Ukrainian army liberated the right bank of the Kherson region and a significant part of the Kharkiv region. Ukrainians realized that the Armed Forces were led by an experienced commander capable of defeating one of the world’s largest armies. At that time, President Zelensky’s apparent jealousy of Zaluzhny’s and the military’s popularity became noticeable.
It was quite interesting to observe the government’s reaction to this popularity, exemplified by the liberation of Kherson on November 11, 2022. It can be assumed that Zelensky did not like that local residents chanted “ZSU” (Zbroyni Syly Ukrainy or “AFU”, Armed Forces of Ukraine) in the main square and that the military, not the president, received all the glory. On that day, jubilant crowds of people, tears in their eyes, thanking Ukrainian soldiers for liberating their city from the occupiers, were shown on TV channels around the world. But just a few days later, on November 14, journalists from CNN, SkyNews, and Hromadske, who had recorded this video from Freedom Square, were deprived of accreditation in Ukraine. The formal reason was a violation of the rules for working in combat zones.
Zelensky visited Kherson the day after its liberation, on November 12. Surrounded by a tight security ring, he also visited Freedom Square, but nobody greeted him joyfully, let alone chanted his name.
The high trust rating of Zaluzhny began to concern the President’s Office, but they could do nothing about it. Since the war continued, the Commander-in-Chief of the army played an extremely important role in defending the country. Moreover, after the liberation of large territories in the Kherson and Kharkiv regions, there was hope for further advancement of the Ukrainian army to drive the occupiers out of the southern part of the Zaporizhzhia region. At the beginning of 2023, social networks and even the press openly predicted a successful counteroffensive by the Ukrainian army. It was just a matter of waiting. Obviously, in such a situation, Zelensky could not dismiss the popular Zaluzhny.
However, the summer counteroffensive of the AFU did not achieve success. From January to April 2023, the Ukrainian army engaged in prolonged battles in the city of Bakhmut, which took a lot of time and resources. Moreover, ally countries delayed the transfer of modern armored vehicles to Ukraine, without which Zaluzhny hesitated to start a counteroffensive.
Time passed, and as it turned out, alongside the battles for Bakhmut, the Russian army managed to build a powerful layered defense in the south, with a huge amount of minefields and dug-in fortifications. There’s a theory that Zaluzhny’s plan was to distract the Russians with a widely advertised offensive in the Zaporizhzhia region and strike the main blow by landing large forces on the left bank of the Dnipro. But the Russians prevented even this scenario. On the night of June 6, 2023, the occupiers blew up the Kakhovka HPP, and several million tons of water rushed downstream, flooding the low-lying left bank. As a result of this monstrous crime, hundreds of civilians and tens of thousands of animals died, but the goal was achieved. The occupiers secured their bank from a sudden offensive by the Ukrainian army. After this, the main combat operations were conducted exclusively in the Zaporizhzhia region, where the Russians had built an effective line of defense. It was not possible to break through it.
The failure of the summer counteroffensive did not undermine Zaluzhny’s popularity among Ukrainians, but in Zelensky’s eyes, he no longer seemed an indispensable commander. Moreover, the president found a favorite − the Commander of the Ground Forces of the AFU, Olexandr Syrsky. By the fall of 2023, a situation had developed where the Ukrainian army was no longer obedient only to Zaluzhny. Syrsky, who was responsible for the front in the Donetsk and Kharkiv regions, could receive orders directly from Zelensky, bypassing the Commander-in-Chief of the AFU. Additionally, the president had another favorite − the head of the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense, Kyrylo Budanov. He also reported directly to Zelensky and had significant military resources at his disposal.
The President’s Office was extremely irritated by any appearance of Valeriy Zaluzhny in the media. He was almost not shown on the “Unified Telethon,” and there were even rumors that Zaluzhny was forbidden to give interviews to Ukrainian media. Whether this is true or not, no one knows, but the Commander-in-Chief of the AFU indeed did not give interviews to Ukrainian journalists after the war began. However, Budanov practically weekly commented on various events, both to local and foreign journalists.
In the fall of 2023, the relationship between Zelensky and Zaluzhny significantly deteriorated after the army commander stated in an interview with The Economist that the war with Russia had reached a stalemate and was becoming positional. According to Zaluzhny, at this stage, one should not expect a rapid breakthrough at the front. Future success depends on who gains a technological advantage over the opponent.
Zelensky did not like the tone of this interview. In the president’s team, there was a tradition of informing the people only about the good prospects of the war. Three days after the interview was published, the Deputy Head of the President’s Office, Ihor Zhovkva, stated that the military should not comment on what is happening at the front to the general public. Zelensky himself spoke out. On November 4, 2023, at a joint press conference with the head of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, the President of Ukraine said that he does not consider the situation at the front to be “stalemate,” as Zaluzhny had described it. This was the first case of public disagreements between the Commander-in-Chief of the AFU and Zelensky.
After the president’s press conference, someone, obviously, was ordered to start discrediting Valeriy Zaluzhny in the press and social networks. On November 6, an article appeared on the Bastion investigative website stating that the Commander-in-Chief of the AFU, during such a difficult time for the country, somehow finds time to write a scientific dissertation. And most terribly, at the Odesa Law Academy, headed by Serhiy Kivalov, a former ally of the fugitive president Yanukovych.
Then, the baton was taken up by a deputy from the “Servant of the People” party with a rather scandalous reputation, Mariana Bezuhla. For several months, up to Zaluzhny’s dismissal, she published rude posts on her Facebook, writing about the professional incompetence of the Commander-in-Chief and even hinting at his fondness for alcohol.
Since it was clear to everyone that everything was heading towards Zaluzhny’s dismissal, information began to spread in parliament that, on the command of the President’s Office, law enforcement agencies could start investigating the “surrender of Kherson.” And Valeriy Zaluzhny could be accused, along with other representatives of the military command.
Raising the question of “who let the Russians into the south” would have been very risky for Zelensky, even considering that he needed to somehow reduce Zaluzhny’s high rating. Facts indicate that a large part of the blame for the army’s unpreparedness for war lies with the president. Therefore, the team at Zelensky’s Office decided not to air their dirty laundry. On January 29, 2024, two sources stated that Zaluzhny was offered to voluntarily resign. In return, the Commander-in-Chief of the AFU was offered to become the Ambassador of Ukraine to the United Kingdom or to move to the position of Deputy Head of the National Security and Defense Council. Of course, both positions were chosen specifically to bury any political ambitions of Zaluzhny.
Ideally, Zelensky wanted to avoid a situation where he could be accused of dismissing a popular general. That’s why the President’s Office insisted that Zaluzhny himself write a resignation letter. But he refused both positions and also did not want to resign voluntarily.
Interestingly, previously, Ivan Bakanov and Oleksiy Reznikov, each after their resignation, really wanted to get the position of ambassador in London. But the British Foreign Office somehow did not show enthusiasm for either of these candidates.
After Zaluzhny refused to write a resignation letter, Zelensky took a pause. The official announcement of the dismissal of the Commander-in-Chief of the AFU was made a week later, without any scandal, with gratitude for the work done and the awarding of the Order of the Hero of Ukraine.
Insiders from the President’s Office reported that when choosing a new army commander, Zelensky was leaning towards the candidacies of Budanov or Syrsky. Many were puzzled by the fact that the head of Ukrainian intelligence, Kyrylo Budanov, had previously had no experience leading any military units. Once he was the commander of a special forces group that made a daring raid into the territory of occupied Crimea in 2016. Then he moved to work in the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense. After the “Wagnergate” and the scandalous dismissal of Vasyl Burba, Budanov became the head of this department.
In the end, common sense prevailed, and Zelensky decided not to tempt fate. The new Commander-in-Chief of the AFU became the more experienced Olexandr Syrsky, Zaluzhny’s deputy and commander of the Ground Forces.
On February 16, 2024, The Washington Post published an article about how the Kremlin had been conducting a disinformation campaign in Ukraine for many months, aimed at creating a rift between the political and military leadership. The essence of the article boiled down to the fact that throughout 2023, Russian propagandists and “troll factories” created thousands of posts and videos on social networks, part of which promoted the theme of a military coup in Ukraine, allegedly being prepared by Zaluzhny against Zelensky.
Indeed, such a campaign of spreading disinformation was conducted, and to a certain extent, it achieved its goal. Knowing Zelensky’s paranoid fear of the possibility of a new revolution, the Kremlin, through structures under its control, in every possible way fueled these fears. The fact that, along with Zaluzhny, practically all members of his team were dismissed, most of whom were experienced generals, indicates that the president’s decision was largely due to personal reasons − the unwillingness to have in the military leadership people loyal to Zaluzhny.
If we discard conspiracy theories that claim Zelensky got rid of Zaluzhny so that he would not interfere with him negotiating with Putin about freezing the war, then the president’s decision arose for the following reasons:
- 60% − the desire to get rid of a possible competitor in future presidential elections;
- 20% − fear of a possible military coup in the spring of 2024, after the formal expiration of Zelensky’s 5-year presidential term;
- 10% − dissatisfaction with the failure of the summer counteroffensive of the AFU;
- 10% − the desire to put at the head of the army a person with whom it would be more convenient for the president to work.
It is worth noting that the Russian disinformation campaign was not aimed at lowering Zelensky’s rating, but at the dismissal of the Commander-in-Chief of the AFU. Zaluzhny is much more dangerous to the Kremlin than the current president. Volodymyr Zelensky is a person who, throughout his conscious life, has shown complete indifference and even contempt for the national revival of Ukraine. An accidental person who, by the will of circumstances, found himself in a difficult situation.
In other words, Putin was much more frightened by the fact that there was a bust of Stepan Bandera on Zaluzhny’s desk. Russia does not need a new Poroshenko, who would consistently develop Ukraine taking into account its national interests. Russia would benefit much more from having an empty-headed populist in Kyiv who, with his incompetence and corruption, would finally ruin the country.