As is known, the decision to invade Ukraine was based on erroneous intelligence data. Putin’s hopes for a blitzkrieg were not fulfilled. The Ukrainian defense did not collapse, Kyiv was not taken “in three days,” and the Afghan scenario did not play out. The Kremlin faced a protracted bloody war for which it was unprepared. Although the Russian army somewhat adapted to the situation by 2023, it is still not ready for a prolonged war. Despite Vladimir Putin’s desire to destroy Ukraine, he cannot do so due to a lack of military equipment and artillery.
According to a report by The International Institute for Strategic Studies dated February 13, 2024, Russia lost at least 3,000 tanks in two years of war. Army replenishment is primarily from stockpiles, through the modernization of old equipment from the 1960s-70s. Russia’s own production of new tanks is estimated at about 200 units per year. Yet, in 2023 alone, the Russian army lost 1,120 tanks.
A similar situation is observed with light armored vehicles and artillery. Russia spends several times more in the war than it can produce. Regarding the modernization of old tanks, their supplies are far from infinite and cannot be depleted to zero. Yes, Putin has no particular problems with mobilization resources, but a war cannot be fought only with infantry and an advantage in aviation. Artillery support and armored vehicles are needed.
To maintain the intensity of combat operations, in September 2023, Putin personally had to ask North Korean leader Kim Jong Un for supplies of artillery shells. Experts estimate that the North Korean regime supplied Russia with no more than 2 million shells, which lasted only a few months of fighting.
The fact that Russia’s armored vehicle reserves are not in good shape is evidenced at least by the fact that in April 2024, the command of the Russian army was forced to urgently transfer 49 APCs from Azerbaijan to the Avdiivka area. These armored vehicles from the 15th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade of the Russian Armed Forces were in Nagorno-Karabakh. After the Kremlin agreed to withdraw its troops from the region under pressure from the Azerbaijani authorities, they were literally moved on wheels to Ukraine to support the ongoing offensive.
Starting in the autumn of 2022, the Kremlin began actively and regularly offering Ukraine and the West to freeze military actions. Ideally, for Putin, the war should end through negotiations during which Ukraine agrees to a range of demands, from not joining NATO to territorial concessions. If Ukraine is not ready for a full settlement of the war through negotiations, Russia agrees to a temporary ceasefire along the actual front line.
Despite public statements by Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov that the main goal of the special military operation is to obtain security guarantees for Russia, this is not entirely true. Talks about NATO expansion are a formal and far from the main reason for the war. After the attempt to overthrow the government in Kyiv failed, the main goal of the Russian president became territorial acquisitions and international recognition of the annexed territories.
What does Putin want as of May 2024? As before, his proposal is peace in exchange for territories. After two years of war, the Kremlin is ready to make even partial concessions. Ukraine must recognize Russian jurisdiction over Crimea and Donbas, and in return, Putin is ready to give Kyiv the occupied territories of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions. In addition, Ukraine must refuse to join NATO, and Russia will not obstruct Ukraine’s entry into the European Union.
People like Donald Trump might consider such an offer a reasonable option. After all, Ukraine only loses three regions out of 25. However, this opinion is based on a misunderstanding of Ukrainian legal norms. As I mentioned earlier, Zelensky does not have the authority to change the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Changing the borders is only possible by adopting a new Constitution, without Crimea and Donbas, or amending the existing Constitution. In both cases, a constitutional majority of 300 deputies is required, and the entire procedure takes at least six months. But the main problem is that Ukrainian society is extremely negative about the prospects of negotiations with Putin and, moreover, about giving up part of the territories. Therefore, the Kremlin’s option to agree on and legislatively approve a new border is impossible.
The most likely scenario for ending the war between Russia and Ukraine is a frozen conflict similar to North and South Korea. It is also quite possible that the war will eventually transition to a low-intensity phase, during which both armies occasionally exchange fire, but the front line remains unchanged.
It is important to understand that the sudden death or removal from power of Vladimir Putin could radically change the entire situation. Regardless of who comes to power after Putin, this person will likely stop military operations and try to negotiate a ceasefire on more favorable terms for Ukraine. It should not be forgotten that this war is based solely on the imperial ambitions of one person—Vladimir Putin. Before February 24, the Russian elite generally did not share Putin’s expansionist plans but was forced to comply with the decision to wage war.
More favorable conditions for ending the war for Ukraine, which may arise after Putin’s death, consist of the so-called Hong Kong scenario. As part of normalizing relations with Ukraine and the West, Russia withdraws its troops from all or most of the occupied territories, except for Crimea or Sevastopol. The Crimean Peninsula (or only Sevastopol) is leased to Russia for 49 or 99 years, after which it returns to Ukrainian jurisdiction, like Hong Kong to China.
Probably, such a scenario for ending the war will find many opponents in Kyiv, who insist on the full restoration of territorial integrity within the 1991 borders. But it is worth reminding that, at the time of writing, Ukraine does not have the capability to return Crimea by military means, at least in the foreseeable future. And the prospects for de-occupation of the entire Donbas territory are becoming increasingly elusive each month.
The most optimal option for Ukraine for now is to continue military operations, expanding strikes on military and industrial infrastructure in Russia. To do this, Ukrainian authorities must significantly increase their own production of missiles and combat drones. Freezing military actions along the existing front line is not advantageous for Ukraine, as it would give Putin the much-needed respite to rebuild military potential. The war might resume after two or three years, but the Russian army would come to the new phase of military operations more prepared.
Relying entirely on Western allies is not advisable, considering how difficult it was for the U.S. Congress to pass funding for Ukraine in April 2024. Moreover, it should not be excluded that in the coming years, politicians less friendly to providing military and financial assistance to Kyiv may come to power in some Western European countries.