The scenario for the capture of Ukraine was envisioned as a special operation, similar to the suppression of the “Prague Spring” in 1968. This is evidenced by the military plans of the Russian army, which, along with prisoners, fell into the hands of Ukrainian military a few weeks after the war began.
On February 21, 2022, three days before the invasion, the command of the 34th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade of the Russian army, which was to advance from Crimea, briefed the personnel on the plan for “performing special (combat) tasks on the territory of foreign states.” According to this document, the Russians intended to capture Mykolaiv and land troops near Odesa within five days. By the ninth day, they aimed to capture Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi and reach the border with Romania. And by the morning of the 11th day of the war, reach the border with Moldova and establish their posts there. Naturally, this plan did not anticipate any prolonged battles with the Ukrainian army.
A similar “blitzkrieg” plan existed for the direction of Kyiv. According to the First Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine, Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk, the Russians intended to capture Kyiv within three to five days. They planned to use special operations forces and airborne troops to seize the Gostomel and Vasylkiv airports near Kyiv. Simultaneously, the enemy aimed to destroy the air defense around the capital, command posts of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Guard, and critical infrastructure objects through missile and air strikes.
After capturing the airports, additional forces were to be continuously landed on their runways using military transport aircraft. Then, the Russian army intended to capture the government district in the center of Kyiv, eliminate or arrest the country’s leadership, and establish a puppet pro-Russian regime in Ukraine. Putin’s triumph would have been a military parade of the Russian army on Kyiv’s main street − Khreshchatyk.
Most likely, the Kremlin planned to return former President Yanukovych to power in Ukraine and declare all legislative acts adopted by the Verkhovna Rada after his flight on February 20, 2014, invalid. The District Administrative Court of Kyiv, which had suddenly decided to consider Yanukovych’s lawsuit on the illegality of his dismissal a few weeks before the war began, was expected to provide invaluable assistance to the occupiers. Obviously, the court was supposed to create a legitimate basis for the restoration of the fugitive president’s power.
Next, Yanukovych was to sign several agreements with Russia: recognizing Russian sovereignty over Crimea and Donbas, and a military and political alliance between Ukraine and Russia. It is quite possible that Putin had additional conditions, about which we do not know. And finally, after a few weeks or months, Yanukovych was to resign and transfer power to Viktor Medvedchuk. During this time, the old composition of the Verkhovna Rada was to appoint Medvedchuk as its speaker. According to the Ukrainian Constitution, the speaker of the parliament becomes the acting president in case of his resignation or death.
Putin and Medvedchuk’s further plans are unknown to us. Most likely, they planned the full integration of Ukraine into Russia, similar to the unification of East and West Germany. A separate scenario was being prepared for the western Ukrainian regions.
It is evident that there was also a Plan B if the Ukrainian army continued to resist and, after the fall of Kyiv, began to retreat to Western Ukraine. Although we do not know this plan, there is unofficial information that the front line was supposed to stop at the administrative borders of the western Ukrainian regions. This is explained by two reasons. First, Putin was allegedly frightened by the prospect of battling a new “Banderite” underground movement for many years, as happened under Stalin in the 1940s and 50s. Second, the population of Western Ukraine, having far fewer cultural ties with Russians, would have hindered the rapid Russification of the rest of the population.
Western Ukraine was likely to become a Russian protectorate similar to the “Vichy regime” in France. However, who was supposed to take on the role of Marshal Pétain remains a mystery.
There are substantial reasons to believe that in the event of capturing Ukraine, complete assimilation among Russians was prepared for the Ukrainians. Socially active citizens involved in pro-Ukrainian activities were expected to face, at a minimum, arrest. The implementation of this scenario could be observed in the occupied territories of the South and East of Ukraine. The first thing the Russians started in the captured cities and villages was the search and detention of citizens with a pro-Ukrainian stance. Then, a few weeks later, Ukrainian books, including fiction, were removed from school and city libraries. The school education process was switched to Russian language and textbooks.
Unlike Soviet leaders, who guaranteed Ukrainians minimal national rights, Putin has repeatedly stated that Lenin’s idea was mistaken. The current President of Russia has long lived in an imperial delusion, in which Ukrainians as a separate nation simply do not exist. Therefore, it is entirely understandable that the destruction of Ukrainian books and Ukrainian-language education logically fits into this theory, as the presence of literature in one’s own language is one of the signs of a nation.