Surprisingly, Poroshenko had a good chance to remain president for a second term, even considering that Kolomoisky’s media holding was actively working for Zelensky’s victory. The problem was not in resources – the problem was in the wrongly chosen strategy.
The first reason why Poroshenko lost was that his information TV channels “Pryamiy” and “5 kanal” had low ratings. Once, during the first Maidan in 2004, “5 kanal” played a decisive role in delivering truthful information to Ukrainians. But since then, the popularity of channels that broadcast news and interviews around the clock had waned. Moreover, unlike in 2004, Poroshenko no longer had a monopoly on this television format. Alongside his channels, several other information channels were broadcasting in Ukraine: “112 Ukraine”, “Espreso”, NewsOne, and “NASH”.
Simply put, there were too many news broadcasts, and Ukrainians returned to the traditional entertainment format with TV shows, movies, and evening news. Poroshenko had time to change the situation. He could have purchased high-rating content from the West and create a major nationalwide channel based on his two channels, which could compete with “1+1” and ICTV. However, the former president was for some reason fixated on information broadcasting and did not fully understand the power that high TV ratings gave his competitors.
Kolomoisky spent between $50 million to $100 million annually on “1+1”. Poroshenko, whose wealth exceeded $1 billion, was either not ready to spend such an amount or did not consider it reasonable. This was the first problem. It’s impossible to win elections when your opponent has a multiple advantage in financial and media resources.
The second reason for Poroshenko’s defeat was the incorrectly chosen electoral campaign strategy. He focused his activity on national-patriotic slogans. While generally correct for the country’s development, they were, to put it delicately, not very relevant for many voters, especially in the South and East of Ukraine. In other words, Poroshenko couldn’t reach a housewife from Mariupol with his ideas. Additionally, he lost the battle for the youth. His election rhetoric of “Army, Language, Faith” did not find enthusiasm among the youth, who, unlike in many other countries, are predominantly apolitical in Ukraine.
Petro Poroshenko could have corrected everything if, instead of national-patriotic slogans, he had chosen a rhetoric closer to the broad electorate. By focusing on his achievements (securing visa-free travel rights for Ukrainians to the countries of the European Union, more than 30 months of stable economic growth), he could have promised Ukraine’s accession to the European Union. That is, “I have already achieved visa-free entry to the EU for you, now I will achieve EU membership for Ukraine and will be able to significantly improve the quality of your life”.
Clearly, even if Petro Poroshenko had chosen this winning strategy, without a nationalwide channel, he still would not have been able to beat Zelensky, who was supported by the richest and most influential oligarchs in Ukraine. Nevertheless, Zelensky had a bunch of disadvantages. Egregious incompetence, Ukrainophobic jokes, and ties with Kolomoisky could have destroyed him. Zelensky was lucky that there was no one to destroy him. Poroshenko had all the necessary financial resources for victory, but he did not understand what Kolomoisky had known for a long time. Control over media resources allows for the shaping of necessary public opinion.
>>> 16. The Weakness of Political Institutions − One of the Reasons for Zelensky’s Victory